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GOVERNMENT ESTOPPEL: THE SEARCH FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
I. INTRODUCTION
When one person has placed reasonable reliance on a statement or
conduct of a second person, equitable estoppel will prevent the second
person from contradicting the statement or repudiating the conduct, even
if the statement is false, in order to prevent injustice to the person who
relied on it.' Equitable estoppel is based upon "the principle that no one
shall be permitted to found any claim upon his [or her] own inequity or
take advantage of his [or her] own wrong." 2
It is "well-settled that the Government may not be estopped on the
same terms as any other litigant."3 Grounds for limiting estoppel of the
government (government estoppel) include: (1) sovereign immunity;
4
(2) the separation of powers theory, under which certain judicial determi-
nations of government liability are inappropriate;5 (3) lack of reasonable
reliance by the person seeking estoppel due to the limited scope of gov-
ernmental agents' authority;6 (4) the greater weight given to public inter-
ests over private interests to be vindicated by estoppel;7 (5) the desire to
limit potentially vast liability;8 (6) protection of the free dissemination of
government information;9 and (7) the fear that an estoppel rule might be
1. Pomeroy defined equitable estoppel as:
mhe effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded,
both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise
existed, either of property, of contract, or of remedy, as against another person, who
has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his
position for the worse, and who on his part acquires some corresponding right, either
of property, of contract, or of remedy.
3 JoHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 804, at 189 (5th ed. 1941).
2. R.H. Steams Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1934) (Cardozo, J.). Pomeroy
also found equitable estoppel to be premised on a policy of apportioning loss in the absence of
fault: "When one of two innocent persons-that is, persons each guiltless of an intentional,
moral wrong-must suffer a loss, it must be borne by that one of them who by his conduct-
acts or omissions-has rendered the injury possible." 3 POMEROY, supra note 1, § 804, at 187.
3. Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984).
4. Lansburgh v. United States, 699 F. Supp. 279, 283 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
5. Phelps v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 785 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1986).
6. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1916).
7. United States v. Nez Perce County, 553 F. Supp. 187, 192 (D.C. Idaho 1982).
8. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. 2465, 2476 (1990).
9. Id.
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used by government agents acting in collusion with private parties to
defraud the government."°
To effectuate these policies, while recognizing that "maladmini-
stration" of government can cause hardship to private citizens, 1 courts
have developed three elements to be proven in order to find an estoppel
against the state: (1) a finding of affirmative misconduct on the part of
the government; 12 (2) a finding that the gravity of the harm to the private
person seeking estoppel outweighs the public interest in protecting the
government from liability; 3 and (3) a finding that the government agent
was acting without actual authority.' 4 To estop the government, then, a
litigant must prove one or more of these additional elements, as well as
the elements of traditional, private estoppel.
In spite of the large number of principles guiding government estop-
pel decisions (or perhaps because of it), the terms on which the govern-
ment may be estopped are not well settled. 5 While the modern United
States Supreme Court has never affirmed a lower court's use of estoppel
against the federal government,' 6 the Court has also expressly refused to
embrace a per se rule immunizing the government from application of
estoppel. 7 This unsettled state of government estoppel law results from
the unclear balance between judicial power on the one hand, and execu-
tive and legislative power on the other.'" The threshold question faced
by a court in deciding whether to estop the government is whether the
court has the power to do so.' 9 Only after answering this separation of
powers question in favor of judicial intrusion may a court go on to ana-
lyze the propriety of granting estoppel on the facts of the case.2"
10. Id. at 2473 (citing Lee v. Munroe, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366, 370 (1813)).
11. Id. at 2478 (Stevens, J., concurring).
12. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1961) (dicta).
13. United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1973).
14. Utah Power, 243 U.S. at 408-09.
15. "The question of when the Government may be equitably estopped has ... received
inconsistent treatment from other Courts of Appeals, and has been the subject of considerable
ferment." Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 791 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
16. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. at 2470 ("[W]e have reversed every finding of estoppel we have
reviewed.").
17. Id. at 2471 ("We leave for another day whether an estoppel claim could ever succeed
against the Government.").
18. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
19. See Phelps, 785 F.2d at 16-17 (potential interference with separation of powers and
public policy concerns limit courts).
20. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Nimmo, 695 F.2d 1251, 1260 (10th Cir. 1982) (McKay, J.,
dissenting), vacated sub nom. Walters v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 467 U.S. 1223 (1984) (sug-
gesting that Supreme Court's government estoppel decisions may be harmonized by recogniz-
ing that they are based on dual inquiry into presence of elements of estoppel and propriety of
frustrating statutory intent). Courts denying government estoppel do not always distinguish
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GOVERNMENT ESTOPPEL
Separation of powers has emerged as the linchpin on which the gov-
ernment estoppel debate turns. In its most recent major discussion of
government estoppel, Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond,21
the United States Supreme Court for the first time2 used the Appropria-
tions Clause of the Constitution23 as a barrier to government estoppel.24
Using the Appropriations Clause to bar government estoppel severely
limits judicial scrutiny of a large class of government estoppel actions
which present in a very sympathetic light the plight of private citizens
whom the government has treated unjustly.
The development of the Supreme Court's government estoppel juris-
prudence shows a trend toward increasingly explicit reliance on separa-
tion of powers and deference to legislative prerogative as a basis for
denying government estoppel. A review of the nineteenth century
Supreme Court estoppel cases reveals a Court which pursued a careful
policy of treating government estoppels under the same rules that gov-
erned private estoppel.25 However, following World War II, the Court
began to ignore private estoppel grounds for denying government estop-
pel claims. 26 This approach matured in Richmond with the Court's use
of the Appropriations Clause27 to deny estoppel in a case which could
have been disposed of on conventional private estoppel grounds.28
The more the decision to estop the government depends on the at-
tributes of government as such, the more acute the need becomes to de-
velop a criterion by which the relative weights of government and private
between the substantive elements of estoppel and the policy against frustrating the legislative
intent. See Note, The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REv. 129, 289-90 (1990)
(Richmond Court explicitly recognized "distinction between power and policy" by invoking
Appropriations Clause to reject estoppel claim).
21. 110 S. Ct. 2465 (1990).
22. Id. at 2472.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law. . .
24. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. at 2471-72.
25. See, e.g., Lee v. Munroe, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366 (1813); The Floyd Acceptances, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 666 (1869); see infra notes 68-121 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) (case decided on
basis of reliance on government agent even though reliance not detrimental).
27. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
28. See infra notes 199-221 and accompanying text for a discussion of Richmond.
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interests can be weighed.29 Courts occasionally explicitly,30 but more
often implicitly,3 engage in such a balancing in government estoppel
cases. The courts are more likely to grant estoppel, or estoppel-like re-
lief, to protect rights of individual freedom such as the right of citizen-
ship and the right to freedom from police entrapment.32 Where the
rights are merely economic rights, courts are less likely to impinge upon
the prerogatives of the other branches of government.33
This Comment reviews the development of government estoppel in
the United States, and analyzes courts' reliance on the separation of judi-
cial, executive and legislative powers as a basis for limiting estoppel of
the government. Given this reliance, it appears that a rule of decision
which overtly recognizes the need to balance public and private interests
will provide a useful measure of clarity to a somewhat muddled area of
the law.
II. BACKGROUND: GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ESTOPPEL
A. The Remedy of Estoppel
Courts typically recite four elements that must be proved in order to
establish an equitable estoppel against a private litigant:
(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he [or
she] must intend that his [or her] conduct shall be acted on or
must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to
believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the
true facts; and (4) he [or she] must rely on the former's conduct
to his [or her] injury.34
29. The Supreme Court decides constitutional issues of governmental power on the basis
of such a balancing. See, eg., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) (state may not restrict
the education of illegal alien children unless its goal is "substantial," due to the "importance"
of education in "maintaining our basic institutions"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968) (state may not abridge First Amendment freedom of speech unless "an important
or substantial governmental interest" is implicated).
30. See infra notes 281-93 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 297-333 and accompanying text.
32. See, eg., United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973) (reli-
ance on government agency interpretation of criminal regulation); Moser v. United States, 341
U.S. 41 (1951) (reliance by resident alien on State Department agent's representation as to
citizenship status).
33. See, eg., Richmond, 110 S. Ct. 2465 (right to receive federal disability annuity); Heck-
ler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51 (1984) (right to federal Comprehensive Educa-
tion and Training Act funds); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (social security
benefits).
34. United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th Cir. 1970) (quoting Califor-
nia State Bd. of Equalization v. Coast Radio Prods., 228 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 1955)). Pro-
fessor Dobbs found "three important elements":
[Vol. 25:229
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The "conduct" referred to in this definition is usually a representation of
fact.3" The representation may also be a promise, in which case the es-
toppel is referred to as promissory estoppel. 6
B. Royal Prerogative
Equitable estoppel is the product of several centuries of judicial
evolution. 37 Three species of the estoppel doctrine have evolved: estop-
pel by record, estoppel by deed and equitable estoppel, also referred to as
estoppel in pals or estoppel by conduct.38 The earliest incarnation of the
estoppel doctrine was estoppel by record, which accorded conclusive ef-
fect to "matters recorded by the king's court, and authenticated by his
seal."' 39 In the sixteenth century, under estoppel by deed, a party could
be estopped to deny facts recited in a document which the party had
The actor, who usually must have knowledge of the true facts, communicates some-
thing in a misleading way, either by words, conduct or silence. The other relies upon
that communication. And the other would be harmid materially if the actor is later
permitted to assert any claim inconsistent with his earlier conduct.
DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.3, at 42 (1973).
Pomeroy gave the following elaboration of the elements:
1. There must be conduct-acts, language, or silence-amounting to a representation
or concealment of material facts. 2. These facts must be known to the party estopped
at the time of his said conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that
knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him. 3. The truth concerning these facts
must be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel, at the time
when such conduct was done, and at the time when it was acted upon by him. 4. The
conduct must be done with the intention, or at least with the expectation, that it will
be acted upon by the other party, or under such circumstances that it is both natural
and probable that it will be so acted upon.... 5. The conduct must be relied upon by
the other party, and, thus relying, he must be led to act upon it. 6. He must in fact
act upon it in such a manner as to change his position for the worse; in other words,
he must so act that he would suffer a loss if he were compelled to surrender or forego
or alter what he has done by reason of the first party being permitted to repudiate his
conduct and to assert rights inconsistent with it.
3 POMEROY, supra note 1, § 805, at 191-92.
35. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. a (1981) ("Estoppel pre-
vents a person from showing the truth contrary to a representation of fact made by him after
another has relied on the representation.").
36. Under promissory estoppel "[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise." Id. § 90.
37. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 189-90 (Cambridge, England, University Press, 2d ed. 1895) (finding application of equi-
table doctrines in king's court during reign of Henry III (1216-72)). The British legal historian
Holosw6rth traced the estoppel doctrine to twelfth century England. 9 WILLIAM S. HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 145-47 (1926).
38. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 144-47; 3 POMEROY, supra note 1, § 802, at 179-
80.
39. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 148.
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signed under seal.' Estoppels by record and by deed were based on a
policy of according evidentiary weight to witnessed documents, and a
policy favoring finality of judicial proceedings.41 Not until the early
nineteenth century did equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, 42 acquire
its modem "ethical content"'43 which focuses on preventing harm to per-
sons who have reasonably relied on the misleading conduct of others.'
The "excellent and curious"4 5 doctrine of estoppel developed in
England in the context of the royal prerogative doctrine.4 The royal
prerogative is the collection of "[t]hose rights and capacities which the
[sovereign] enjoys alone in contradistinction to others and not.., those
which he enjoys in common with any of his subjects."47 Existing "out of
the ordinary course of the common law, in right of [the sovereign's] royal
dignity,"48 the royal prerogative is the oldest part of the constitution of
England.49
40. 9 id. at 154.
41. 9 id. at 149, 154.
42. "Estoppel in pals" refers to the doctrine that a person can be estopped on the basis of
conduct of which the jury, the "pays," might have some knowledge, in contradistinction to
estoppel on the basis of "self-proving" court records and other documents which a person had
solemnified by affixing a seal. 9 id at 145.
43. DOBBS, supra note 34, § 2.3, at 42.
44. Pickard v. Sears, 112 Eng. Rep. 179, 181 (1837) ("[Where one by his words or con-
duct wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces
him to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from
averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time .... "); see also
Branson v. Wirth, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 32, 42 (1873) ("If one person is induced to do an act
prejudicial to himself in consequence of the acts or declarations of another, on which he had a
right to rely, equity will enjoin the latter from asserting his legal rights against the tenor of
such acts or declarations."); Sprigg v. Bank of Mount Pleasant, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 257 (1836).
Sprigg enforced an estoppel based on a sealed instrument, but its statement of the rule is
couched in terms sufficiently general to encompass estoppel by conduct:
An estoppel has sometimes been quaintly defined, the stopping a [person's] mouth
from speaking the truth; and would seem, in some measure, to partake of severity, if
not of injustice. But it is in reality founded upon the soundest principles, as a rule of
evidence. That a party has, by his own voluntary act, placed himself in a situation as
to some matter of fact, that he is precluded from denying it; and in its application to
the dealings and contracts of men in the affairs of human life, it is a salutary practical
rule, that a man shall not be permitted to deny what he has once solemnly
acknowledged.
Id at 265.
45. EDWARD COKE, COKE UPON LITrLETON § 352a (London, Saunders & Benning
1830).
46. See generally 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 340-425 (1938) (historical develop-
ment of royal prerogative).
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1330 (6th ed. 1990).
48. 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 341 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *239).
49. 10 id. at 340.
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The royal prerogative afforded the sovereign numerous preferences
in judicial proceedings in which the rights of the king conflicted with
those of a subject.50 These preferences included the doctrine that "'The
King is not bound by estoppels' . ... On the other hand the King could
take advantage of an estoppel, though, as between subjects, estoppels
must be mutual." 51
These privileges arose at a time when the king's court, the curia
regis, was the center of royal authority performing legislative, executive
and judicial functions without differentiating among them. 2 As late as
the end of the seventeenth century, the courts of law were literally the
king's courts, and the judges were servants of the king.5 3 The sovereign,
who was "immortal and infallible... [and] who was accepted as the
head and representative of the state" exerted "large powers of control"
over the courts.5 4 The courts in turn obliged the sovereign by creating
"all sorts of remedies which were not open to the subjects, all sorts of
exemptions from the ordinary rules of pleading, and all sorts of proce-
dural privileges."5 5 Judges, mindful that they served at the monarch's
behest, developed "to their utmost logical consequences, principles and
rules which favoured the king."56 Even after judges gained a measure of
independence and security of tenure after the Revolution of 1688, these
hypertechnical rules remained."
Although the royal prerogative and the susceptibility of the king's
50. 10 id at 343-45, 357. The monarch, conceived as omnipresent in his or her courts,
could not be nonsuited for failure to appear. 10 id at 345. Further, statutes of limitation did
not bind the crown, and hence neither could the equitable principle of laches. 10 id. at 355.
51. 10 id. at 357 (quoting Sir Edward Coke's Case, 78 Eng. Rep. 169, 175 (1623)). Sir
Edward Coke's Case held that lands granted by Queen Elizabeth in conjunction with a grant of
office could be demanded in payment of a debt which the office holder owed to the Queen. 78
Eng. Rep. 169, 169 (1623). This was an estoppel by deed, not an estoppel in pais. Later cases
distinguished Coke's Case from cases involving equitable estoppel. See Attorney General v.
Collom, 2 K.B. 193, 204 (1916) ("A further, point was raised that no estoppel binds the
crown .... I know of no authority for the proposition as applied to estoppel in pais.").
52. CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSITrUTIONS 31 (Julius
Goebel, Jr. ed., 1946).
53. 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 346. As late as the reign of Edward 11 (1307-
1327) the king actually decided cases. 1 id at 194. Until the Revolution of 1688, judges held
office "durante bene placito," that is, at the pleasure of the crown. 1 id. at 195; 6 id. at 514.
James II (reigned 1685-1689) dismissed judges for "the least disobedience," 6 id at 509-10,
such as failing to condemn to death James' political enemies. Id. Such sovereign excesses led
in part to the Revolution of 1688, and to the Act of Settlement which provided in part that
judges would serve during good behavior, "quamdiu se bene gesserint," and could be removed
from office only "upon the address of both Houses of Parliament." 6 id. at 234.
54. 10 id. at 346.
55. Id.
56. 10 id. at 358.
57. 10 id. at 346.
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court to political pressure resulted in these procedural advantages, the
executive was not omnipotent. The application of equitable remedies
against the king was a feature of even the earliest development of eq-
uity.58 The "bromide that 'the King can do no wrong,' , actually is a
reference to the limitations on the king's power and should be read, "the
king has no authority to do wrong."'  The maxim that the king is not
bound by estoppel has been attacked as a fallacy.6" Equitable estoppel
had not come into existence at the time the royal prerogative barred ap-
plication of estoppel to the king.62 Nevertheless, the doctrine of equita-
ble estoppel continues to bear the marks of extreme judicial deference to
63sovereign power.
C. Origins of Government Estoppel in the United States
As the doctrine of equitable estoppel evolved in the United States, so
did litigants' efforts to apply its principles against the government. Royal
prerogative provided a singularly unsatisfactory basis for refusing to ap-
58. See CHARLES REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND 273 (1980).
59. Giles v. Carlin, 641 F. Supp. 629, 636 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
60. "'The king's prerogative,' says Finch, 'stretcheth not to the doing of any wrong.' This
was a serious limitation upon his powers." 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 360. The
reference is to HENRY FINCH, LAW, OR A DIscouRsE THEREOF; IN FOUR BOOKS 85
(London, Henry Lintot 1759).
61. See F.E. Ferrer, A Prerogative Fallacy-"That the Crown is not Bound by Estoppel", 49
LAW Q. REv. 511, 514-15 (1933). As an example of an estoppel of the crown, the author
cites, among other cases, Plimmer v. Mayor of Wellington, 9 App. Cas. 699 (1884). Ferrer,
supra, at 515 n.26. In Plimmer, the crown for many years allowed Plimmer to use shoreland
in New Zealand for a wharf such that Plimmer was considered to have a license revocable at
will. Plimmer, 9 App. Cas. at 710. During the period from 1856 through 1861, at the request
of the crown, Plimmer made improvements to the property. Id. at 705-06. In 1880 a statute
passed giving title to the shoreland to another party, and in 1882 a statute granted compensa-
tion to anyone with "any estate or interest" in the shoreland. Id at 707. The court held that
the crown's conduct during the years 1856 to 1861 made the license irrevocable, and Plimmer
had acquired a compensable interest. Id at 715. The conduct of the crown in acquiescing to
Plinmer's use, and in requesting, Plimmer to improve the property, operated to estop the
crown from later contesting Plimmer's interest in the property.
62. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 146-47 (estoppel by conduct dates from 1837;
estoppel by record dates from twelfth century).
63. And, as Holdsworth warned:
[Tihe survival of these procedural prerogatives is at the present day far more danger-
ous to individual liberty than at any other period, because they are at the disposal of
a democratic government-a form of government which Burke, with some reason,
said was the most shameless and fearless thing in the world, and more oppressive
than any other form of governmint to a minority; for, while Kings or aristocracies
were always more or less conscious of the fact that they must conciliate public opin-
ion by a moderate use of their powers, the majority in a democratic state, however
small it is, always imagines that it voices public opinion, and so can act as it pleases
without further reflection.
10 id. at 347 (citations omitted).
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ply estoppel to secular authorities "deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed."" The early government estoppel cases in the
United States scrupulously avoided basing decisions on the sovereignty of
the governmental litigant.6" Nevertheless, judicial limitations on the
power of the executive were regarded as problematic66 and limitations on
government estoppel developed to protect against that danger.
Although courts have developed numerous bases for rejecting estop-
pel claims against the government, a persistent thread of decisions recog-
nizes that when a person has acted in reasonable reliance on
representations of the government, a change in governmental position
which harms that person offends basic notions of fairness and equity.6 7
An examination of three nineteenth century government estoppel cases
illustrates that the United States Supreme Court treated the government
no differently than it would have treated a similarly situated private
litigant.
1. Lee v. Munroe
The earliest case in which the United States Supreme Court was
called upon to decide the application of estoppel against a government
64. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
65. See infra notes 68-121 and accompanying text.
66. See, eg., The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868) ("[Ihe public service would be
hindered, and the public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suit
at the instance of every citizen, and consequently controlled in the use and disposition of the
means required for the proper administration of the government."). In the nineteenth century
Blackstone could still admit that "it would be of most mischievous consequence to the public,
if the strength of the executive power were liable to be curtailed without its own express con-
sent, by constructions and implications of the subject." 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at
355 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *261-62). In the United States the
need for judicial independence was linked to the need for a judiciary that could serve as a
check on the power of the other branches of government. "Madison and Hamilton described a
judiciary that is 'not separated from the legislative and executive powers' as 'a threat to general
liberty' . . . ." Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable
Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661, 672 (1978) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
67. See St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., dissent-
ing) ("Our Government should not by picayunish haggling over the scope of its promise, per-
mit one of its arms to do that which, by any fair construction, the Government has given its
word that no arm will do."); Foote's Dixie Dandy, Inc. v. McHenry, 607 S.W.2d 323, 327
(Ark. 1980) (corollary to Justice Holmes' remark that "'[Citizens] must turn square corners
when they deal with the Government,'" is principle that government should "'be held to a
like standard of rectangular rectitude when dealing with its citizens."' (quoting John M.
Maguire & Philip Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal Taxation, 48
HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1299 (1935))); Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 500 (1859) ("[People]
naturally trust in their government, and ought to do so, and they ought not to suffer for it.");
Raoul Berger, Estoppel.Against the Government, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 680, 686 (1954) (modern
state in essence "public service corporation" which ought to take responsibility for its wrongs).
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litigant is Lee v. Munroe 68 in 1813. Lee is repeatedly cited as evidence of
the antiquity and, presumably by inference, the propriety of the rule
against estopping the government.69 Lee, however, was decided strictly
on principles of conventional estoppel and affords no basis for a rule
prohibiting government estoppel.70
In Lee, the plaintiff complained that misrepresentations made by
two city commissioners of Washington, D.C. misled him to his detri-
ment.71 Two business partners named Morris and Nicholson, not parties
to the action, had prepaid the city for the purchase of real estate.72 As
Morris and Nicholson needed to "draw" on this land account, they
would apply to the city commissioners, who would convey the lots as
requested.73 Morris and Nicholson owed Lee $3,OO. 7 4 They agreed
with Lee that they would discharge their debt to him by means of a con-
veyance of land from the city to Lee.75 When Lee approached commis-
sioners Munroe and Thornton and explained the arrangement between
Lee and Morris and Nicholson, the commissioners agreed to transfer the
lots to Lee upon receiving a direction to do so from Morris and Nichol-
son.76 Morris and Nicholson then gave Lee a written direction to that
effect.77 Lee, believing the paper to be worth something, surrendered to
Morris and Nicholson their promissory notes for the $3,000.78 When he
presented the direction to Munroe and Thornton, they refused to convey
the lots unless Lee paid for them, since Morris and Nicholson actually
had a negative balance in their account with the city.79 Morris and Nich-
olson became insolvent and Lee, casting about for a locus of blame,
looked to the city commissioners who had led him to believe that the city
68. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366 (1813).
69. See, eg., Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. 2465 (1990):
From our earliest cases, we have recognized that equitable estoppel will not lie
against the Government as against private litigants. In Lee v. Munroe & Thornton,
we held that the Government could not be bound by the mistaken representations of
an agent unless it were clear that the representations were within the scope of the
agent's authority.
Id. at 2469 (citation omitted).
70. Lee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 369.
71. Id. at 368.
72. Id. at 369.
73. Id.
74. Id. The dollar amount is given in the reporters syllabus. Id. at 366.
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would transfer the land to him." Lee sued on a theory of estoppel.81
The Court refused to grant Lee any relief, 2 holding that the repre-
sentation by the commissioners to Lee was "altogether gratuitous," and
since it was not "within the sphere of their official duties, the United
States cannot be injured by it."83 Yet, at first blush, the facts seem to fit
the definition of estoppel: the city officers knew or reasonably should
have known the true state of affairs; Lee was ignorant of the true state of
affairs and was without means of discovering the true state of affairs; and
Lee relied on the officials' misrepresentations, and was injured as a re-
sult. 4 Why no estoppel?
First, Lee is not a promissory estoppel case;85 Lee did not sue on the
promise made by Munroe and Thornton to transfer the land upon pres-
entation of the order by Morris and Nicholson. 6 Rather, the suit was
for the misrepresentation of fact.8 7 Had the doctrine of promissory es-
toppel been extant in 1813, Lee might have stated his claim as one seek-
ing to estop the government from breaching its promise to pay.88
Instead, the commissioners' promise was "gratuitous," as the Court ob-
served, and hence could not form the basis of an enforceable contract.8 9
Second, the decision is clearly based on conventional principles of
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id at 369.
83. Id.
84. Whether Lee's injury was caused by Munroe's and Thornton's misrepresentation, or
by Lee's own precipitous surrender of the notes, was an issue not lost on the Court. "The
court will not inquire whether the plaintiff really suffered any injury from the confidence which
he placed in the commissioners, or whether he lost his remedy against Morris and Nicholson
(of which very serious doubts may well be entertained)." Id.
85. See supra note 36. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has gained wide acceptance as
such only during the present century. See IA ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 194, at 194 (1973) (although prior law not inconsistent with promissory estoppel, in 1901
Justice Holmes could still write: "'Of course the mere fact that a promisee relies upon a
promise made without other consideration does not impart validity to what before was void.'"
(quoting Martin v. Meles, 60 N.E. 397 (Mass. 1901))). Williston coined the term "promissory
estoppel" in 1920. Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel Requirements and Limitations of
the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 459, 459 (1950).
86. Lee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 369.
87. Id. at 368.
88. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898) (granddaughter's quitting job
in reliance on grandfather's gratuitous promise to provide granddaughter with two thousand
dollar demand note sufficient to make promise enforceable against grandfather's estate). In
Lee, the commissioners' statement (that they would transfer the land to Lee upon presentation
of a direction from Morris and Nicholson) could be characterized either as a promise to trans-
fer the land, or as a representation of the fact that Morris and Nicholson's account had a
positive balance.
89. Lee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 369.
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agency law and estoppel. The Court made no attempt to form a princi-
pled basis for distinguishing unauthorized misrepresentations of govern-
ment agents from those of private agents.9° Under conventional
principles of agency law, the principal is not liable for representations of
the agent made outside the scope of the agent's authority.91 The Court
rejected Lee's claim as an attempt to extend the liability of the govern-
ment for actions of its agents beyond that recognized for principals in
general.92 Under Lee, unauthorized actions of government and private
agents give rise to identical levels of liability.93
Third, the Court's strict approach was based on the conventional
rule governing estoppel to assert title to land, and not on the sovereignty
of the government. 94 In order to estop another party from asserting title
to land, the party seeking to raise the estoppel had to prove that the other
party's original representation was not merely erroneous, but was made
with the intent to defraud.9" This rule developed to prevent insecurity of
land titles and disruption of the rights and expectations of innocent third
parties that would result from permitting an estoppel to contravene re-
corded title documents.96 Since Lee had not asserted that Munroe and
Thornton had perpetrated a fraud, and neither Munroe nor Thornton
had an interest in the property, the rule did not apply. Thus, Lee is
90. Id. at 368. The Court noted:
It is... not known to the court that [equitable estoppel of a principal who fraudu-
lently asserts to a prospective mortgagee that there are no encumbrances on the prin-
cipal's land] ... has been extended so as to affect the interests of principals, and
particularly of the pub lic, in consequence of similar mistakes made by an agent, nor
is it reasonable that such extension should take place, unless it most manifestly ap-
pear that the agent was acting within the scope of his authority ....
IdL
91. RE TATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1958). For a general discussion of
agents' power to bind the principal see General Overseas Films, Ltd. v. Robin Int'l, 542 F.
Supp. 684, 688-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 718 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1983).
92. Lee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 368.
93. Id
94. Id
95. Boggs v. Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal. 279, 367-68 (1:359), error dismissed, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 304 (1866); Trenton Banking Co. v. Duncan, 86 N.Y. 221, 224 (1881); 3 POMEROY,
supra note 1, § 807, at 201-03. But cf 4 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY § 1235, at 1124 (3d ed. 1975) ("decided weight of authority" does not require fraud in
order to give rise to land title estoppel).
96. 3 POMEROY, supra note 1, § 807, at 203; see infra notes 228-32 and accompanying
text. That these considerations governed the decision is evident from the Court's language:
But in all the cases which have been decided on this principle, the fraud, for such it is
supposed to be, has been practiced by a party who has himself an interest in the
subject-matter of inquiry, who cannot well be mistaken, and whose conduct therefore
ought to be conclusive on him, when the rights of third persons come in question.
Lee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 368.
97. See Lee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 368. Because the agents' actions were unauthorized,
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properly read primarily as a land title estoppel case, and only seconda-
rily, if at all, as a government estoppel case.
Finally, Lee predates the first explicit recognition of equitable estop-
pel by conduct by twenty-four years.98 Lee cannot illuminate the sub-
stantive content of a doctrine which did not exist at the time Lee was
decided.
2. The Floyd Acceptances
Another case often relied on99 to bolster the legitimacy of the rule
against estopping the government is The Floyd Acceptances.100 This case,
like Lee,10 1 was decided on conventional private estoppel grounds.1 "2
Far from creating a no-estoppel rule to shield the government from lia-
bility, the Supreme Court reasoned from the "proposition... too well
established by the decisions of this court, to admit now of serious contro-
versy," that the United States, when it becomes a party to commercial
paper, is "bound... by the same principles that govern individuals in
their relations to such paper."' 1 3
In 1859, one Russell, along with co-venturers Waddell and Majors
(Russell & Co.), contracted with the United States Army to sell and de-
liver provisions to the Army's garrison in Utah."° Most of the contracts
required the Army to pay for the supplies only upon delivery,10 5 in con-
formity with a statute which prohibited the government's making ad-
vance payments for goods and services.106 Russell was unable to raise
the cash necessary to fund the expedition.10 7 To cure this difficulty Rus-
the agents' fraud could not be imputed to the principal; and since the agents did not have an
interest in the title, that fraud would not be imputed to the agent as a matter of law. Id at
368-69. Hence, the estoppel would not be granted. Id at 369. "If the commissioners acted
fraudulently, which is not pretended, they may be personally liable in damages to the plaintiff;
but if it were a mistake, and such it is represented to be,... the United States cannot, and
ought not, to be affected by it." Id.
98. Pickard v. Sears, 112 Eng. Rep. 179 (1837), is generally regarded as the first statement
of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 146; see supra note
44 and accompanying text.
99. See, eg., Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. 2465, 2469 (1990)
(citing Floyd as example of Court's refusal to estop government).
100. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666 (1869).
101. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 366.
102. Floyd, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 675.
103. Id
104. Id. at 681.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 682 (citing Act of Jan. 31, 1823, ch. 9, 3 Stat. 723).
107. Id. at 668.
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sell secured Secretary of War John B. Floyd's acceptances 08 on a series
of bills of exchange drawn by Russell & Co., payable in ten months to
Russell & Co.'s own order. The drafts were to be paid out of the amount
the Army would owe upon performance of the contract. 10 9 The effect of
the notes and the acceptances was to secure for Russell the credit of the
United States, thus permitting Russell to negotiate the bills of exchange,
raise the money and perform the contract." 0
Over five million dollars were raised in this manner and some four
million dollars' worth of these drafts were redeemed by Russell, appar-
ently out of the money earned on the contract."' However, after the
United States had fully paid the contract price, notes worth over one
million dollars remained outstanding." 2 Russell & Co. was presumably
without funds to redeem the outstanding notes, and the holders applied
to the federal government for payment on the strength of Floyd's
acceptances.'13
The Court held the United States not liable on the acceptances.
1 14
The Secretary had acted in contravention of an express statutory limita-
tion of authority, and hence was without even apparent authority to ac-
cept the drafts.' 1' Russell & Co. took the acceptances with this infirmity,
and, as
[iln the case of such paper, issued by an individual . . . the
person dealing with the agent, knowing that he acts only by
virtue of a delegated power, must, at his peril, see that the pa-
per on which he relies comes within the power under which the
agent acts. And this applies to every person who takes the pa-
per afterwards." 16
The Court found the Secretary lacked the authority to issue the ac-
ceptances because the only source of a federal official's authority is con-
stitutional or statutory law, and neither source authorized the Secretary
to issue the acceptances." 7 While this rule pertains to the unique
method by which the government communicates with its citizens, the
108. In commercial law, an acceptance is the drawee's signed engagement to honor the
draft. U.C.C. § 3-410 (1977).
109. Floyd, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 682.




114. Id. at 683.
115. Id at 682.
116. Id. at 676.
117. Id. at 676-77.
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principle on which it is grounded is a conventional rule of the law of
agency: apparent authority arises upon representations made by the
principal to the third party. 118 In the case of the government, the Consti-
tution or a statute serves as that representation.' 
9 Absent such a repre-
sentation, apparent authority cannot arise.1
20
In Floyd, as in Lee, the Court displayed a solicitous concern with
protecting the federal government from uncontrollable fiscal 
liability. 121
Nevertheless, that protection was provided on the basis of conventional
rules of estoppel; the same result would have been achieved if the United
States had been a private party.
3. Ultra vires acts
The development of the doctrine that ultra vires 1
22 actions of mu-
nicipal corporations are void and cannot form the basis of a claim also
illustrates the early tendency of courts to treat the government litigant no
differently than a private litigant. Municipal charters often limit the
means by which the city may enter into contracts,
23 for instance, by
requiring competitive bidding 24 or by restricting the power of the city to
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958) ("[A]pparent authority... is cre-
ated as to a third person by... conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes
the third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by the
person purporting to act for him.").
119. See infra notes 247-80 and accompanying text.
120. Floyd, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 676. This "strong" position holds that when an action is
not specifically permitted it is prohibited. Id at 680-81. Courts more recently have applied a
"weak" version of the same rule, under which an action is permitted if no statute or regulation
prohibits it. See People's Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 554, 563-66 (1987)
(where no statute, regulation, or internal policy prohibited Farmers Home Administration
employee from guaranteeing repayment of loan, and in view of broad powers which Adminis-
tration granted to its loan officers, official had actual authority to issue loan guarantees).
121. The Court stated:
If A. authorized B. to buy horses for h im, and to draw on him for the purchase
money, B. cannot buy land and bind A., by drawing on him for the price. Such a
doctrine would enable a [person], in private life, to whom a well defined and limited
authority was given, to ruin the principal who had conferred it. So it would place the
government at the mercy of all its agents and officers, although the laws under which
they act are public statutes. This doctrine would enable the head of a department to
flood the country with bills of exchange, acceptances, and other forms of negotiable
paper, without authority and without limit. No government could protect itself,
under such a doctrine, by any statutory restriction of authority short of an absolute
prohibition of the use of all commercial paper.
Floyd, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 681.
122. "Ultra vires" literally means "beyond the powers." The term is applied to actions of a
corporation which are beyond the powers conferred on it by its charter or by the statute under
which it was created. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1522, 1570 (6th ed. 1990).
123. Whitworth College v. City of Brookhaven, 161 F. Supp. 775, 780 (D. Miss. 1958),
aff'd, 261 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1958) (statutory restriction).
124. Smith v. City of Riverside, 34 Cal. App. 3d 529, 536, 110 Cal. Rptr. 67, 72 (1973).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:229
borrow money. 125 Courts interpret these restrictions as evincing a strong
legislative policy against collusion between city officials and the persons
paid out of the city treasury. 126 So strong is this policy that courts will
view contracts made in violation of those regulations as void, not merely
voidable.'2 7 As a result, the contractor will neither be able to estop the
city to deny the contract, which would give the contractor the benefit of
the bargain, nor recover in quantum meruit the benefits which its con-
tract performance has-bestowed on the city. 128 The operation of the doc-
trine of ultra vires concerns actions which the corporation itself is
incompetent to perform, as distinguished from actions outside the scope
of the individual agent's authority but which are otherwise intra vires.129
Although early decisions decided governmental ultra vires cases on the
same ground as private corporation ultra vires cases, and although the
doctrine has died out in the area of private corporations, it is still applied
today with respect to municipal corporations.
1 30
Early California cases serve as an example of this development. In
Argenti v. San Francisco,13 1 the City of San Francisco was held liable on
a contract for grading and planking of streets. The contractor had per-
formed all the work and brought suit for payment of the contract
price."'32 The city sought to avoid payment by asserting that the amount
of the contract was in excess of the limits set by the city's charter and
125. City of Juneau v. Hixson, 373 P.2d 743 (Alaska 1962).
126. DOBBS, supra note 34, § 13.4, at 989. The danger of collusion is one of the traditional
rationales for prohibiting government estoppel. See Lee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 370. "It is
better that an individual should now and then suffer by such mistakes than to introduce a rule
against an abuse of which, by improper collusions, it should be very difficult for the public to
protect itself." Id. This passage was quoted with approval in Richmond, 110 S. Ct. at 2473.
127. Seif v. City of Long Beach, 36 N.E.2d 630, 632 (N.Y. 1941) (no recovery for services
performed by city counsel hired by mayor where city charter restricted power to hire to city
council).
128. DOBBS, supra note 34, § 19.4, at 989.
129. Discussing Pennsylvania law, which recognizes the apparent authority of municipal
agents, one court explained the distinction as follows:
A municipal corporation cannot be bound by the ultra vires acts of its agents, except
that it may be bound by such acts if it had the power to authorize them but did not.
A more common way of articulating this principle is that an act is ultra vires in the
"primary sense," and therefore void, if it is "utterly beyond the jurisdiction" of the
municipal corporation; it is ultra vires only in a "secondary sense," and therefore
subject to estoppel, if it is merely "the irregular exercise of a basic power under the
legislative grant in matters not in themselves jurisdictional."
Wilson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 709 F. Supp. 623, 626 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (quoting
Albright v. City of Shamokin, 419 A.2d 1176, 1178 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)).
130. Id.; Vermont Dept. of Public Servs. v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec., 558 A.2d
215, 225 (Vt. 1988).
131. 16 Cal. 255, 264-65 (1860).
132. Id. at 262.
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was, therefore, ultra vires.'33 Nevertheless, the court held that since the
city had received the benefit of the contract and had acquiesced in the
actions of its agent in entering into the contract, "[i]t would be a fraud
upon the plaintiff to permit [repudiation by the city]. ' 134 In his concur-
rence, Justice Field expressly dissented from the view that the city could
be estopped to deny the ultra vires acts of its governing body.135 He
concurred in the judgment on the ground that the contracts were within
the city's charter, but did "not consider that, independent of such con-
tracts, any liability would attach to the city for the improvement of the
streets. A municipal corporation can only act in the cases and in the
mode prescribed by its charter."'3 6
Justice Field's view soon gained sway. Two years later, in his con-
currence in Zottman v. San Francisco,'37 Justice Cope expressly repudi-
ated the doctrine of estoppel which he had espoused in the opinion he
authored in Argenti.138 Writing for the court in Zottman, Justice Field
held that a contractor could not recover for extra work performed in
conjunction with a valid contract with the city to erect a fence, where
that extra work was requested ultra vires.13 9 The city charter provisions,
"whilst conferring authority upon the Common Council, also fixed the
bounds of their action. Beyond them they could not go, and give validity
to their acts.... A contract made in disregard of these stringent but wise
provisions cannot be the ground of any claim against the city."'" The
court recognized that reliance on unauthorized acts of government
agents is unreasonable and hence does not give rise to an estoppel.1
4
1
133. Id. at 259-60.
134. Id. at 274. "It is well settled in relation to the contracts of corporations, that where
the question is one of capacity or authority to contract, arising either on a question of regular-
ity of organization, or of power conferred by the charter, a party who has had the benefit of the
contract cannot be permitted, in an action founded upon it, to question its validity." Id. at
264-65.
135. Id. at 282 (Field, J., concurring).
136. Id. (Field, J., concurring).
137. 20 Cal. 96 (1862).
138. Ie at 108 (Cope, J., concurring).
139. Id at 104-05.
140. Id. at 101.
141. Id. at 104-05.
It may sometimes seem a hardship upon a contractor that all compensation for work
done, etc., should be denied him; but it should be remembered that he, no less than
the officers of the corporation, when he deals in a matter expressly provided for in the
charter, is bound to see to it that the charter is complied with. If he neglect this, or
choose to take the hazard, he is a mere volunteer, and suffers only what he ought to
have anticipated. If the statute forbids the contract which he has made, he knows it,
or ought to know it, before he places his money or services at hazard.
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The rule permitting a city to deny its power to contract was not
unique to sovereign litigants. Private corporations which received bene-
fits under an ultra vires contract also were not estopped to deny the valid-
ity of the contract. 42 The reasoning was that the scope of the
corporation's activities is a matter of law determined by the legisla-
ture.143 A court which estopped the corporation to repudiate a promise
would breach the separation of powers doctrine."4 Courts' reliance on
the "interest of the public" 145 to support the unenforceability of ultra
vires contracts derived from turn-of-the-century society's distrust of large
corporations. 4  Thus, at its origin, the doctrine prohibiting estoppel to
deny ultra vires activities of municipalities began as a rule applicable to
both public and private entities alike. The rule denying recovery to the
contractor in Zottman, for instance, was the rule that mistaken improve-
ments to real property did not give rise to a right of restitution for the
value conferred.' 47
The ultra vires doctrine was harshly criticized in the context of pri-
vate corporation law for its unjust results.' 48 Many jurisdictions over-
ruled the doctrine by legislation, 149 and it finally became moribund.'5
142. See, eg., California Nat'1 Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362, 367 (1897) (corporation can
"plead its want of power" to escape liability under ultra vires contract).
143. As the United States Supreme Court noted:
The doctrine of ultra vires, by which a contract made by a corporation beyond the
scope of its corporate powers is unlawful and void, and will not support an action,
rests .... above all, [on] the interest of the public, that the corporation shall not
transcend the powers conferred upon it by law.
McCormick v. Market Nat'l Bank, 165 U.S. 538, 549-50 (1897).
144. See, eg., Bank of the United States v. Owens, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 527, 538-39 (1829)
(Court allowed no recovery on promissory note issued in violation of bank's charter, since to
do otherwise would render Court "handmaid of iniquity. Courts are instituted to carry into
effect the laws of a country; how can they then become auxiliary to... violations of the law?").
145. McCormick, 165 U.S. at 550.
146. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-66 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(historical review of limitations on scope of corporations' powers); see also R. Mason Lisle,
Judicial Legislative Estoppel, 20 YALE L.J. 110 (1910) (ultra vires doctrine should be strictly
adhered to because "in America, to-day, there is hardly any one thing which has contributed
more to the present uneasiness and discontent than the almost universal feeling that corpora-
tions are not subordinate to the law.").
147. See DOBBS, supra note 34, § 5.8, at 368 ("[O]ne who in all good faith entered land and
built on it had no affirmative remedy. He could not sue either at law or equity to recover the
value of the improvements from the owner.").
148. Charles E. Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires be Discarded?, 33 YALE L.J.
49 (1923).
149. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 124 (1983); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
AcT § 3.04 (1985).
150. Widespread use of unrestricted corporate charters has rendered the doctrine otiose.
ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 207 (4th ed. 1990) (modern corporate charters con-
taining general purpose clauses authorizing "all lawful business" greatly reduce but do not
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Its application as a basis for restricting government estoppel is no less
objectionable. To the extent the doctrine has survived in the government
estoppel context it illustrates the same development as the affirmative
misconduct element from the time of Lee v. Munroe 151 to the present. 152
Courts have abandoned the no-estoppel rule in private ultra vires cases,
but have retained the rule in the context of governmental ultra vires. The
development of government estoppel in these cases is properly character-
ized not as the erection of discrete barriers unique to government estop-
pel, but rather as the retention of barriers which formerly applied to
private and government estoppel alike but which courts have abandoned
as unjust in the private estoppel arena.
4. Clark v. United States: An example of government estoppel
In Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond,153 Justice Ken-
nedy asserted that the United States Supreme Court has reversed every
lower court governmental estoppel case that has come before it,1 14 and
that "not a single [Supreme Court] case has upheld an estoppel claim
against the Government for the payment of money."1 55 This statement
appears to be incorrect. Exactly such an estoppel was granted by the
Supreme Court in 1877 in Clark v. United States.
1 ' 6
In Clark, the United States Army had entered into an oral contract
with Clark to use Clark's steamship on a trial run. 157 The agreement
called for payment of $150 per day, and required the Army to pay Clark
the value of the vessel if it were lost.15 8 Eight days into the trial run,
while under the command of the Army, the ship was wrecked and de-
clared a total loss. 15 9 The Army defended against Clark's suit for the
daily rental and the value of the vessel on two grounds. First, since oral
contracts were prohibited by federal statute, the contract was void.
1 60
Second, since Clark did not have valid title to the vessel, he could not
claim amounts due for its rental.1 6 The Supreme Court accepted the
eliminate possibility of ultra vires contracts); see also ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW
675-76 (1986) (ultra vires problem now "largely of historical interest").
151. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366 (1813).
152. See infra notes 223-46 and accompanying text.
153. 110 S. Ct. 2465 (1990).
154. Id. at 2470.
155. Id. at 2473.
156. 95 U.S. 539 (1877).
157. Id. at 539-40.
158. Id. at 540.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 542.
161. Id. at 541, 543-44.
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first defense162 but curtly rejected the second.163
Federal law required that all contracts with the Army be in writing;
hence the oral contract for the trial run was void."' Voicing a theme
that has echoed through government estoppel cases to this day, 65 the
Court permitted the Army to deny its oral contract since "[e]very [per-
son] is supposed to know the law," '166 and, therefore, by entering into
such a contract the person "is knowingly accessory to a violation of duty
on his part."
' 16 7
Nevertheless, the owner of the vessel was entitled to quantum me-
ruit damages for the Army's use of the vessel during the ill-fated shake-
down cruise, and the basis for that award was a government estoppel.168
Although the Court did not use the term "estoppel" to describe its rejec-
tion of the defense based on invalid title, the elements of a conventional
estoppel were clearly present. 169 Further, the Court rejected the defense
because "it would be bad faith on the part of the Government. 1 7  This
places the equitable considerations at the foundation of the Court's
162. Id. at 542.
163. Id. at 544.
164. Id. at 542.
165. See infra notes 247-66.
166. Clark, 95 U.S. at 542.
167. Id
168. Id at 543-44. The Court's rejection of the Army's objection based on lack of title is
illuminating:
The other objection relied on by the Government in this case is, that the claimant
had no valid title to the steamer as against the United States, having obtained her
from the Confederate Government, in 1863, in payment for supplies furnished to the
Quartermaster's Department of that government. This objection cannot be sus-
tained.... The claimant was applied to for [the steamer's] use. It was agreed that he
should be compensated. No question was made about his title, and it is not suggested
that he was guilty of any concealment or suppression of the truth in regard to it.
Under these circumstances, it would be bad faith on the part of the Government after
getting possession of the steamer and getting it within its jurisdiction, under pretense
of hiring it of the claimant, to set up that he had no title to it. This is so obviously in
accordance with the justice of the case, that we deem it unnecessary to make any
further observations on the subject.
Id
169. The Army, in chartering the ship, ought to have known the true state of its title; the
chartering constituted conduct amounting to a representation to Clark that the Army was
satisfied with the title; Clark relied on this representation to his detriment by entering into the
charter, and would be harmed if the Army were permitted to deny She title. Id. at 539-40,
544; see supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (enumerating elements of estoppel). The
rule of the case is a corollary to the rule that the lessee is estopped to deny the landlord's title,
since the benefits of possession enjoyed by the lessee were predicated on the lessee's recognition
of that title. Although the estoppel involves title to property, it is, nevertheless, an equitable
estoppel, and not estoppel by deed. See, eg., CAL. EviD. CODE § 624 (West 1991) ("Estoppel
of tenant to deny title of landlord. A tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at
the time of the commencement of the relation."); Tewksbury v. Magraff, 33 Cal. 237 (1867).
170. Clark, 95 U.S. at 544.
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reasoning.171
This review of early estoppel cases in the United States illustrates
that the Supreme Court did not apply government estoppel as a separate
doctrine, but rather took pains to treat the United States as it would any
other litigant.172 Such a reading of the cases explains why the Court
recognized an estoppel against the Army in Clark. It also raises the fur-
ther question as to the origin of the rule against government estoppel.
III. MODERN APPLICATION OF ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT: THE SEARCH FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
In contrast to early government estoppel cases, the modem United
States Supreme Court has given -up its earlier, careful refusal to base re-
jections of government estoppel on executive and legislative prerogative,
and has consciously striven to base its estoppel decisions on the constitu-
tional attributes of the political branches and their relation to the judici-
ary.1 73  Simultaneously, the Court has distanced itself from
nonconstitutional grounds such as affirmative misconduct.174 The fol-
lowing sections examine conventional rules under which courts limit
government estoppel in the light of the donstitutional doctrine of separa-
tion of powers. While the rules of affirmative misconduct175 and limited
171. Three justices dissented, but only to the holding relating to the enforcement of the
parole agreement, and not to the estoppel issue. Id at 544-46.
172. See, eg., Floyd, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 675 (United States and individuals "bound... by
the same principles"); Lee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 368 (applying same estoppel rule to United
States as in "all the cases which have been decided on this principle").
173. See, e.g., Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. 2465 (1990) (gov-
ernment estoppel prohibited by Appropriations Clause of Constitution); Federal Crop Insur-
ance Corp. v. Merrill, 322 U.S. 380 (1947) (relying on Congress's exclusive power to charge
treasury to deny estoppel claim). The early cases are not without suggestion of the separation
of powers rationale. See, e.g., United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398
(1814). Claimants below were bona fide purchasers of a shipment of coffee which had been
imported into the United States in violation of a federal trade embargo. Id. at 399. The cus-
toms official, however, had granted a permit to import the coffee and had issued a receipt for
the duty. Id. at 400. In defense to an action to compel forfeiture of the coffee, claimants
argued that the acts of the customs officer should estop the United States from treating the
coffee as contraband. Id. at 401-02. The Attorney General of the United States argued that
the collector had no authority to waive the penalty, and therefore could not be presumed to
have waived it. Id. at 404. The Court did not address the estoppel argument explicitly, but its
decision to uphold the forfeiture is couched in terms of unmistakable deference to the legisla-
ture's prerogative to affix penalties for statutory violations. Even though "cases of hardship
and even absurdity" might result from the Court's decision to uphold the forfeiture, "provision
is made by law for affording relief under authority much more competent to decide on such
cases than this court ever can be." Id. at 405.
174. See Richmond, 110 S. Ct. at 2469.
175. See infra notes 223-46 and accompanying text.
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scope of government agents' authority176 are grounded in the separation
of powers, the best rule for limiting government estoppel is a rule which
balances public and private interests in light of the limitations on judicial
review imposed by the separation of powers doctrine.
177
A. Propriety of Judicial Review
The appropriateness of judicial review is inverse to the efficacy of
political remedies.1 7  This thesis forms a "cornerstone of constitutional
law." 179 Where adequate remedy from onerous laws can be exacted from
the legislature, courts are reluctant to interfere with the political pro-
cess.180 In the area of government estoppel, only the most egregious ex-
amples of governmental bad faith provoke self-adjustment by the
political branches.18 Thus, there is a need to develop a viable theory of
judicial review for government estoppel cases.
B. The Ascent of Legislative Prerogative
1. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill
Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill 18 2 is the leading modem
case18 3 of estoppel against the federal government. In Merrill, the
United States Supreme Court gave full expression to the presumption
176. See infra notes 247-80 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 281-333 and accompanying text.
178. See Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); United States v. Carolene Prods., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
179. Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 Sup. Cr. REv. 397,
398.
180. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. A strong statement of the principle was given in
Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 453, 461, 202 P.2d 38, 43 (1949) ("Legislative power
must be upheld unless manifestly abused so as to infringe on constitutional guaranties.").
181. A prominent federal example is the policy statements of the tax commissioner in the
1920s and 1930s. Perhaps the most noted change in position was Couzens v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928), in which the Commissioner changed the valuation of
Ford Motor Co. minority stock after Couzens sold his shares. Id. at 1146-47. This case led to
the IRS policy of honoring its rulings. See Berger, supra note 67, at 680. Another example is
the "good faith" clauses in certain federal acts which prohibit such reversals. See, e.g., Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1988), which provides in part:
[N]o provision of this title imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omit-
ted in good faith in conformity with any rule or regulation of the Commission,
notwithstanding that such rule or regulation may, after such act or omission, be
amended or rescinded or be determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid
for any reason.
Id.; see also Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57b-4 (1988); Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947, 29 U.S.C. § 259 (1988); Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. 2465,
2473-74 (1990) (citing other examples of good faith provisions).
182. 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
183. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. at 2469.
GOVERNMENT ESTOPPEL
that private persons know the law. The Court also invoked an explicitly
constitutional basis for denying recovery: only Congress has power to
charge the federal treasury."8 4
In Merrill, a local agent for the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
(FCIC) erroneously issued an insurance policy on petitioner's replanted
wheat crop."8 5 Published federal regulations excluded such crops from
the FCIC program. 8 6 The crop failed, 8 7 and payment on the policy was
denied.' 8 The Court ruled that, because the regulations were published,
the petitioner had constructive notice of their provisions, and refused to
estop the government on the basis of the unauthorized statements of a
local agent.18 9 But the Court also justified its holding on the ground that
it is "the duty of all courts to observe the conditions defined by Congress
for charging the public treasury."' 190
Merrill is notable not only for its overt reliance on the separation of
powers, but also for the fact that the constitutional issue did not have to
be reached. Presented as an alternative ground to the decision (which
was also based on the government agent's lack of apparent authority),' 9 '
the separation of powers argument was gratuitous. Furthermore, since
there was no alternative source of insurance available to the respondent
farmers in Merrill, their reliance on the advice of the federal agent did
not work a detriment. 192 In Merrill, the Court went out of its way to
invoke a limited scope of review when the United States was before it as a
litigant. In this regard, Merrill stands in contrast to Lee v. Munroe,
193
The Floyd Acceptances' 94 and Clark v. United States,195 in which the
Court strove to avoid reliance on separation of powers issues.
The Merrill Court hinted at the reason for this change. In explain-
ing that persons are charged with constructive knowledge of administra-
184. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 385. To "charge the treasury" is to "create liability on the part of
the government." Id
185. Id. at 382.
186. Id. at 381-82, 386.
187. Id at 382.
188. Id. at 386.
189. Id. at 384-85. This reason is identical to that which governed the case in The Floyd
Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666 (1869). See supra notes 99-121 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Floyd. The Merrill Court cited Floyd in support. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 384.
190. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 385.
191. Id at 384.
192. See United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1973) ("It should be
noted that in Merrill, the farmers had no alternate means of obtaining crop insurance... and
therefore, they did not rely to their detriment on the erroneous advice.").
193. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366 (1813); see supra notes 68-98.
194. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666 (1869); see supra notes 99-121.
195. 95 U.S. 539 (1877); see supra notes 153-71.
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tive regulations as well as statutes at large, 196 the Court noted that
"Congress has legislated in this instance, as in modern regulatory enact-
ments it so often does by conferring the rule-making power upon the
agency created for carrying out its policy."19 7 The Court was continuing
its project, begun in the 1930s with the abandonment of substantive due
process as a limitation on the police power, of making the country safe
for the administrative state.198
2. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond
Merrill's placement of a constitutional shield between the Court and
the administrative state was furthered last term by Office of Personnel
Management v. Richmond. 199 While Richmond could have been decided
on the rule that equity courts, no less than law courts, are bound to ob-
serve a statute,2"° the Court instead reached the constitutional issue of
separation of powers by basing its decision 201 on the Appropriations
Clause.20 2
Charles Richmond was a welder at the Navy Public Works Center
in San Diego, California.20 3 He qualified for a disability retirement annu-
ity, which was conditioned on Richmond's earning capacity remaining
196. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 384.
197. Id (emphasis added).
198. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been invoked from about
1887 to 1934 to strike down legislation that regulated labor and other commercial practices.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding law prohibiting alcoholic beverages, but
asserting propriety of judicial review of substantive basis of invocation of police power); Loch-
ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down law limiting bakers to 10-hour days or 60-
hour weeks as beyond the police power); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding
milk price legislation, returning to more deferential scrutiny of regulatory laws). Two years
prior to Merrill, the Court held that in construing administrative regulations courts must defer
to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation unless that interpretation is "plainly errone-
ous or inconsistent with the regulation." Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14
(1945). On the correlation between deferential judicial review and the rise of the modem ad-
ministrative state, see Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM.
L. REv. 1 (1983) (judicial oversight of public administration necessary to vindicate fundamen-
tal political axiom of limited government); see also Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless
Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron USA Inc. v. NRDC, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 986 (1987)
(judicial deference to agency interpretation appropriate only where Congress has expressly
granted interpretive authority to agency).
199. 110 S. Ct. 2465 (1990).
200. "Wherever the rights of the parties are clearly governed by rules of law, courts of
equity will follow such legal rules." 2 POMEROY, supra note 1, § 425, at 189-90.
201. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. at 2473.
202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law .... .
203. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. at 2467.
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below a level "fairly comparable to" his rate of pay at retirement.2" Not
wishing to exceed that limit, Richmond, who had taken part-time work,
asked a Navy Employee Relations Specialist what level of income would
trigger the limiting condition attached to the annuity." 5 The specialist
erroneously told Richmond that his annuity would continue so long as
Richmond did not earn more than eighty percent of his rate of pay at
retirement for two consecutive years.2 "6 While that had been the law
prior to 1982, the law had since been amended to provide that "[e]arning
capacity is deemed restored if in any calendar year the income of the
annuitant ... equals at least 80 percent of the [rate of pay at retire-
ment]."2 "7 The specialist also provided Richmond with an outdated
pamphlet which gave the same erroneous advice.208 Later, exercising
what may have seemed an abundance of caution, Richmond again re-
quested the same information of the Navy, and again received the same
erroneous advice.2°9 Relying on this advice, Richmond earned in excess
of the eighty percent limit, thinking that because his earnings two years
prior had not exceeded the limit his benefits would not be affected.210
The Office of Personnel Management applied the one-year limitation pro-
vision and discontinued Richmond's disability annuity.211
Reversing the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals,2 12 the Supreme
Court held that the Office of Personnel Management could not be es-
topped to deny the validity of the specialist's erroneous advice, since do-
ing so would violate the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution.213
The Court reasoned that "[flor the particular type of claim at issue here,
a claim for money from the Federal Treasury, the [Appropriations]
Clause provides an explicit rule of decision."2 4
204. I
205. Id at 2468.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2467-68 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 8337(d) (1988) (emphasis added by Court)).
208. Id. at 2468.
209. Id
210. Id.
211. Id. The annuity was restored six months later, since in the immediate prior year (after
learning the correct eligibility limit), Richmond did not earn more than allowed. Richmond's
total loss for the six months during the suspension was $3,993. Id.
212. Richmond v. Office of Personnel Management, 862 F.2d 294 (Fed. Cir. 1988), rev'd,
110 S. Ct. 2465 (1990).
213. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. at 2467. The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Ken-
nedy. Id. Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, wrote a separate concurrence. Id at
2476 (White, J., concurring). Justice Stevens wrote separately, concurring in the judgment,
but expressly disagreeing with the reasoning which based the decision on the Appropriations
Clause. Id at 2477 (Stevens, L, concurring). Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan,
dissented. IAL at 2478 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
214. Id at 2471.
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Where Merrill215 and its progeny216 were content to limit judicial
review of government actions because of the structural constitutional
limitation of separation of powers, Richmond places the constitutional
restraint in a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department." ' 7 The result is to turn the
government estoppel question into a political question, rendering it be-
yond the competence of the judiciary.218 The Court's recitation of a lit-
any of political remedies to which the victim of a governmental reversal
of position may turn demonstrates that this was the Court's intention.2"9
Richmond's resort to the Appropriations Clause to reject an estop-
pel claim has been criticized as a procrustean attempt to apply an ill-
fitting doctrine.22' Nevertheless, the decision explicitly conditions the
appropriateness of government estoppel on the power of courts to invade
215. 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
216. See, e.g., Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51 (1984) (per curiam)
(United States not estopped to recover overpayments of Medicare benefits despite applicant's
reliance on erroneous advice); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (per curiam) (errone-
ous advice by Social Security Administration field representative did not give rise to govern-
ment estoppel since court could not overlook valid regulations).
217. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
218. See id. at 210.
219. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. at 2473-75. Legislative relief from detrimental reliance on the
erroneous advice of government agents is provided by several devices. First, the "good faith"
clauses of certain statutes prohibit the assessment of penalties against persons who have relied
to their detriment on government agent's erroneous or later reversed interpretations of regula-
tions and statutes. Id. at 2473. Second, private laws and "reference cases" (cases referred by
Congress to the United States Claims Court) are used by Congress to "provide remedies in
individual cases of hardship." Id. at 2475. A private law is a law that deals with the affairs of
a specific individual, as opposed to a public law, which deals with the affairs of the nation
generally. As with public laws, a private law begins as a bill introduced by a legislator, which
is sent to committee, reported and voted upon, and ultimately signed or vetoed by the Presi-
dent. See Donald A. Wall & Robert Childres, The Law of Restitution and the Federal Govern-
ment, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 587, 589 (1971) (discussing private bills and jurisdiction of Claims
Court). The inadequacies of the private bill remedy have long been recognized. See id. at 594
(private bills and reference cases consume large amounts of valuable committee and subcom-
mittee resources, and lack of standards for passing bills and referring cases causes inconsistent
results). The Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (1946) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 and scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1988)), was enacted as a remedy to the
inadequacies of the private bill system. United States v. Smith, 111 S Ct. 1180, 1195 n.12
(1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. See Richmond, 110 S. Ct. at 2477 (Stevens, J., concurring) (Appropriations Clause
prohibits unappropriated expenditures but does not determine whether rules governing appro-
priation have been adhered to; administrative agency's maladministration of appropriated
money may require estoppel to effectuate intent of Congress); see also id. at 2481 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (Appropriations Clause does not speak to issues of statutory interpretation or ap-
propriateness of estopping government); Note, supra note 20, at 294 (invoking Appropriations
Clause constitutionalizes government estoppel and unsettles this area of constitutional
jurisprudence).
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221the legislative and executive spheres of power.
C. Separation of Powers
In order to account for the special case of government estoppel,
courts have developed the additional elements of affirmative misconduct,
the refusal to base estoppel on unauthorized conduct of government
agents, and the balancing of public and private interests. All of these
elements draw their ultimate rationale from the requirement that a court
must justify intrusive review of legislative actions by reference to some
policy sufficiently important to override the basic tenet of separation of
powers. The government estoppel decisions which turn either on a bal-
ancing of interests or on the affirmative misconduct rule justify judicial
review by applying an analysis similar to that used in equal protection
and due process jurisprudence.
The overt reliance on separation of powers in government estoppel
cases is a fairly recent phenomenon.222 A court which estops the govern-
ment from denying the unauthorized acts of its agent is in effect ex-
tending the law under which the agent is acting. The administrative
agent violates the separation of powers by committing a legislative act;
the court does the same in ratifying it, or in ordering the executive
branch to provide relief which would exceed the authority which the leg-
islature had granted the executive.
1. Affirmative misconduct
One means by which courts seek to limit the application of estoppel
to the government is to require that the representation on which the
party seeking estoppel relied was an act of "affirmative misconduct.
'223
221. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. at 2474 ("Judicial adoption of estoppel based on agency misin-
formation would... vest authority in these agents that Congress would be powerless to con-
strain."). The Court noted that "Congress has always reserved to itself the power to address
claims... that 'the equities and circumstances of a case create a moral obligation on the part
of the Government to extend relief to an individual.'" Id at 2475 (citation omitted).
222. Explicit reference to the separation of powers doctrine possibly dates back no further
than 1966. Kondo v. Katzenbach, 356 F.2d 351, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Wright, J., dissenting),
rev'd sub nor. Honda v. Katzenbach, 386 U.S. 484 (1967). In 1954 one author noted that
there was at that time little overt reliance on separation of powers in the cases, yet "judicial
stress upon authority as the test of estoppel stems from that doctrine." Berger, supra note 67,
at 686.
223. The progenitor is Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1961) (American Con-
sulate official's "well-meant advice... falls far short of the misconduct such as might prevent
the United States from relying on petitioner's foreign birth"); see also INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5,
8 (1973) (per curiam) (dicta) (failure to fully publicize rights accorded under statute does not
give rise to affirmative misconduct). Many federal circuit courts of appeal have embraced the
affirmative misconduct standard. See S&M Inv. Co. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 911
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The United States Supreme Court has not offered a definition of the stan-
dard,224 but its application by other courts indicates that its scope in-
cludes egregious wrongs of an intentional, or at least a reckless,
nature.225 Courts which adopt the affirmative misconduct test will then
require that a government estoppel rest on proof of five elements: the
four elements which make up a private estoppel, 226 and affirmative
misconduct.227
The limiting doctrine of affirmative misconduct was not cut from
whole cloth to apply to government estoppels. As shown by the discus-
sion of Lee v. Munroe,225 it was present in the common law doctrine of
estoppel to assert land titles.229 In both the land title and government
F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 963 (1991); Matter of Lapiana, 909 F.2d
221, 223 (7th Cir. 1990); Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1136 (2d Cir. 1990); Miller v.
United States, 907 F.2d 80, 82-83 (8th Cir. 1990); Richmond v. Office of Personnel Manage-
ment, 862 F.2d 294, 296 (Fed. Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 2465 (1990); United States v.
Asmar, 827 F.2d 907, 911-13 (3d Cir. 1987); Fano v. O'Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1265 (5th Cir.
1987). The Eleventh Circuit has not yet adopted the affirmative misconduct exception. See
Lansburgh v. United States, 699 F. Supp. 279, 283 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
224. The Court has observed that one relevant factor may be the failure of a government
agent to comply with a regulation. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789-90 (1981) (per
curiam).
225. See, eg., Morgan v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Eistoppel against
the government must rest upon affirmative misconduct going beyond mere negligence."). See
generally Fred Ansell, Comment, Unauthorized Conduct of Government Agents: A Restrictive
Rule of Equitable EstoppelAgainst the Government, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1026, 1044-45 (1986)
(citizens have right to freedom from gross governmental misconduct); Julia A. Hershiser,
Note, Estoppel and the Affirmative Misconduct Requirement-Chien-Shih Wang v. Attorney
General, 21 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1149, 1156-61 (1988) (affirmative misconduct should include
intentional or reckless misconduct resulting in deprivation of statutory right).
226. The party to be estopped knows or should know the facts; the party seeking estoppel is
ignorant of the facts, reasonably relies on the misleading conduct of the other party, and would
suffer detriment absent estoppel. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
227. See Morgan, 779 F.2d at 545.
228. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366 (1813); see supra notes 68-98 and accompanying text.
229. Intentional fraud inducing reliance is an essential element only in cases "in which an
owner of land is precluded from asserting his legal title by reason of intentionally false repre-
sentations or concealments, by which another has been induced to deal with the land." 3
POMEROY, supra note 1, § 805, at 196-97.
The theory that intentional fraud is necessary to induce the reliance appeared in Boggs v.
Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal. 279 (1859) (Field, J.). The court enumerated the necessary ele-
ments of land title estoppel as follows:
First, That the party making the admission by his declaration or conduct was ap-
prised of the true state of his own title; second, That he made the admission with the
express intention to deceive, or with such careless or culpable negligence as to
amount to constructive fraud; third, That the other party was not only destitute of all
knowledge of the true state of the title, but of the means of acquiring such knowledge
and, fourth, That he relied directly upon such admission, and will be injured by
allowing its truth to be disproved.
IAd. at 367-68.
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cases, the rationale for limiting the application of estoppel to cases of
intentional misconduct is one of policy: some principle must be em-
ployed to limit the potentially disruptive effect which the estoppel would
have on the rights of innocent third parties.23 0 Because the cases in
which government agencies have intentionally misled the public are
bound to be few, requiring affirmative misconduct severely limits govern-
ment estoppel.23' Still, the lower courts have been willing to find "affirm-
ative misconduct" in the actions of government agents.23 2
Recent Supreme Court dicta seriously impugn the viability of the
affirmative misconduct approach. The Supreme Court in Office of Per-
sonnel Management v. Richmond clearly distanced itself from the affirm-
ative misconduct doctrine, criticizing it as a source of "needless
litigation. ' 23 3  After summarizing the development of the affirmative
misconduct doctrine, which arose "[d]espite the clarity of. . . earlier
decisions, ' 23 4 the Court observed that "Ithe language in our decisions
has spawned numerous claims for equitable estoppel in lower courts," 235
but all such determinations have been reversed on appeal.236 The Rich-
230. Pomeroy gives the rationale for the requirement of intentional or constructive fraud as
an element in estoppel to assert land titles as follows:
[W]hile the owner of land may by his acts in pais preclude himself from asserting his
legal title, 'it is obvious that the doctrine should be carefully and sparingly applied,
and only on the disclosure of clear and satisfactory grounds of justice and equity. It
is opposed to the letter of the statute of frauds, and would greatly tend to the insecu-
rity of titles if they were allowed to be affected by parol evidence of light or doubtful
character.'
3 POMEROY, supra note 1, § 807, at 202-03 (quoting Trenton Banking Co. v. Duncan, 86 N.Y.
221 (1881)); see also United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973) (granting
estoppel to partnership that had relied on governmental representations). The effect of the
estoppel in Lazy FC Ranch was "to allow a partnership to receive payments to which it was
not legally entitled, reducing appropriations available for qualified partnerships." David K.
Thompson, Comment, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 COLUM. L. RIv. 551, 565
n.21 (1979). Requiring affirmative misconduct permits a court to provide relief in "exception-
ally sensitive cases without exposing the government to open-ended liability for merely negli-
gent or improper actions and omissions by its agents." I& at 560.
231. Comment, Never Trust a Bureaucrat: Estoppel Against the Government, 42 S. CAL. L.
REv. 391, 397 (1969) (because of officers' competence and expertise, and reluctance to incur
censure of personnel authorities, official advice correct "in the vast majority of cases").
232. See, ag., Richmond, 862 F.2d at 299 (Navy personnel specialist's providing out of date
pamphlet and offering consistent erroneous advice to applicant's detriment was sufficient af-
firmative misconduct for estoppel to apply).
233. 110 S. Ct. 2465, 2470 (1990).
234. Id. at 2469.
235. Id. at 2470.
236. Id. Lower courts have already begun relying on Richmond to deny government estop-
pel claims based on affirmative misconduct, yet the Court's refusal to explicitly disapprove the
affirmative misconduct doctrine has left its status ambiguous. See Essen Mall Properties v.
United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 430, 447 (1990) ("In any event, the Supreme Court has recently held,
in the context of government employee misconduct, that the doctrine of equitable estoppel will
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mond Court also criticized the affirmative misconduct doctrine because it
runs counter to the Federal Tort Claims Acte37 (FTCA) which does not
accept tort liability for the misrepresentations of government agents.238
The FTCA, however, is not implicated in the granting of an estoppel,
since the misrepresentation can be completely innocent239 and therefore
nontortious. 24°
If the requirement of affirmative misconduct is indeed an attempt to
limit disruption of settled expectations of third parties by means analo-
gous to the "actual fraud" element in the land title estoppel cases, then it
is subject to criticism not for spawning false hopes but rather for interfer-
ing with the legitimate rights of private litigants. In land title cases, the
reason for requiring fraud is to protect the settled expectations of inno-
cent third parties.24 1 The loss in such a case is the entire loss of title to a
single parcel of land.24 2 As between an innocent purchaser and a seller
lacking technical legal rights, the loss will fall fully on one or the other;
estoppel provides a systematic way of assigning that loss to the party who
"rendered the injury possible. '24 3
The loss faced by the government in the typical entitlements case is
a monetary loss represented by the benefit at stake.2' Such a loss is
not He against the government."). But cf. United States v. Hatcher, 922 F.2d 1402, 1409-10
(9th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing Richmond and applying affirmative misconduct test). For a
case relying on Richmond as authority to apply the affirmative misconduct test, see Gibson v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 750 F. Supp. 1565, 1572-73 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (citing Richmond for
proposition that "the Supreme Court has held that some type of 'affirmative misconduct' is
necessary to estop the Government.").
237. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (1946) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 and scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1988)).
238. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. at 2474 ("[T]he FTCA by its terms excludes both negligent and
intentional misrepresentation claims from its coverage. The claim brought by respondent is in
practical effect one for misrepresentation, despite the application of the 'estoppel' label." (cita-
tion omitted)). The exclusion of liability for misrepresentation is found at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(1988).
239. On the possibility of raising an estoppel on the basis of an innocent misrepresentation
see 3 POMEROY, supra note 1, § 803, at 185.
240. As tortious conduct is wrongful conduct, innocent conduct is by definition nontor-
tious, since no innocent conduct is wrongful. See generally W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 1-6 (5th ed. 1984) (offering definitions of
"tort").
241. 3 POMEROY, supra note 1, § 807, at 202-03. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the doctrine of estoppel to assert title to land.
242. "In equity the person in favor of whom the owner is estopped to claim the land is
entitled to a conveyance of the land by the owner.... ." 4 TIFFANY, supra note 95, § 1235, at
1125.
243. 3 POMEROY, supra note 1, § 803, at 187.
244. See, eg., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) (insurance settlement
paid by government-funded crop insurance corporation).
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necessarily passed on to taxpayers and is thus distributed over society as
a whole. The settled expectations of members of the taxpaying public,
responsible individually for an infinitesimal part of the cost of the depri-
vation to the private party, are not comparable to those of the innocent
land purchaser who stands to bear the entire loss alone. Of course, the
Takings Clause245 of the Fifth Amendment, which requires the govern-
ment to pay just compensation for private property which it takes for a
public purpose, places constraints on the government's tendency to force
such losses on individuals, rather than accept responsibility and dis-
tribute them over society. 46
2. Unauthorized acts of government agents
The principle under which an agent with apparent authority has
power to bind a principal 47 is closely related to equitable estoppel.2 48 In
general, government agents who act beyond their scope of express or im-
plied authority do not bind the government under either a theory of ap-
parent authority or estoppel.z49 Conversely, where the government
245. "[Ior shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
246. "One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is 'to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole."' Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4
(1987) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
247. Apparent authority is "the power to affect the legal relations of another person by
transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in accord-
ance with the other's manifestations to such third persons." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 8 (1958).
248. "[IThe principle which underlies the doctrine of the implied authority of an agent in
most of its applications, and which prevents the principal from denying the authority which,
by his conduct, he has held the agent out to the world as possessing, is identically the same
principle which constitutes the essence of all equitable estoppels." 3 POMEROY, supra note 1,
§ 801, at 177-78. This is not to say that the effect of the two doctrines is identical. Apparent
authority, unlike estoppel, requires no change in position of a third party; apparent authority
creates rights in both principal and third party whereas estoppel creates no rights in the party
to be estopped. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or AGENCY § 8 cmt. d (1958).
249. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917) ("[T]he United
States is neither bound nor estopped by acts of its officers or agents in entering into an arrange-
ment or agreement to do or cause to be done what the law does not sanction or permit."); see
also Merrill, 332 U.S. at 383-84 (1947) ("[A]nyone entering into an arrangement with the
Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the
Government stays within the bounds of his authority."); Hicks v. Harris, 606 F.2d 65, 68 (5th
Cir. 1979) ("[E]ven if government employers purported to waive the requirements for ob-
taining federal student loan insurance ... they were acting outside the bounds of their author-
ity and could not bind the government .... "); Michael C. Pitou, Equitable Estoppel Its
Genesis, Development and Application in Government Contracting, 19 PuB. CONT. L.. 606,
623-25 (1990) ("It has generally been held that the unauthorized act of government employees
cannot support an estoppel against the government.").
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action is authorized an estoppel will often lie.250 This rule is intimately
bound up with the requirement of good faith reliance on the part of the
person invoking the estoppel.251  The unauthorized acts of government
bureaucrats cannot give rise to "apparent" authority for the same reason
that erroneous bureaucratic advice cannot be reasonably relied upon.25 2
Justifications for the rule include separation of powers and protection of
the public treasury.253
The rule that a government agent's unauthorized acts will not give
rise to an estoppel is a venerable one.254 In Utah Power and Light Co. v.
United States,255 the United States sued to enjoin certain power compa-
nies from using dams and other power generation plants which they had
placed on public lands without permit or license from the Secretary of
the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture, as required by law.256 The
power companies argued that they had a vested right in continued use of
the generating facilities, and, therefore, the United States was estopped to
deny their right to use the land.257 The power companies claimed to
have relied on the representations of "some unmentioned officers or
agents of the United States, to the effect that the reservations [of the land
as national forest] would not be an obstacle to the construction or opera-
tion of the works in question. ' 25' The Court gave this argument short
shrift: "Of this it is enough to say that the United States is neither bound
nor estopped by acts of its officers or agents in entering into an arrange-
ment or agreement to do or cause to be done what the law does not
sanction or permit.
'2 9
250. See, eg., Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 729 F.2d 801, 807-08 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (federal govern-
ment official estopped to deny validity of contract where official had authority to waive admin-
istrative regulation which would have barred contract, and acted in way which induced private
party's reliance on official's intent to waive regulation); Ritter v. United States, 28 F.2d 265,
267 (3d Cir. 1928) ("The acts or omissions of the officers of the government, if they be author-
ized to bind the United States in a particular transaction, will work estoppel against the gov-
ernment, if the officers have acted within the scope of their authority.").
251. See infra note 262.
252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958) (representations of principal "rea-
sonably interpreted" give rise to apparent authority) (emphasis added).
253. The underlying basis of the unauthorized actions rule is a concern "that judicial vali-
dation of unauthorized actions by federal officials may infringe on congressional authority
under the separation of powers doctrine." Thompson, supra note 230, at 562.
254. See The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666, 679-80 (1869).
255. 243 U.S. 389 (1917).
256. Id at 402.
257. Id at 403.
258. Id at 408-09.
259. Id Private estoppel is likewise unable to violate a statute. See Hedges v. Dixon
County, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893) ("Courts of equity can no more disregard statutory and
constitutional requirements and provisions than can courts of law."); 2 POMEROY, supra note
[Vol. 25:229
November 1991] GOVERNMENT ESTOPPEL
The internal workings of a private agency relationship are presumed
private and beyond the knowledge of the most conscientious, except as
revealed at the discretion of the principal."° By contrast, citizens are
charged with constructive knowledge of the workings of their govern-
ment.26 1 The functioning of the "no apparent authority" rule follows
immediately from that charge.262 The availability of information on the
workings of government makes independent verification of the authority
of agents at least a theoretical possibility. 63 Also, on a purely theoretical
level, the distinction between agent and third party breaks down in the
case of government contracts. Since the agent's authority is vested by
"the representatives of the American people in Congress assembled, ' ' 264 a
private citizen who relies on the agent's representation is identified with
the agent's principal. Thus, the private citizen is chargeable with the
principal's, knowledge on the basis of a legal fiction analogous to that
which charges a partnership with the knowledge of each partner.26  Still,
1, § 425, at 189 (equity courts "are bound by positive provisions of a statute equally with
courts of law"); Note, supra note 20, at 291 (1990).
260. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 cmt. b ("[A]pparent authority exists
only as to those who learn of a manifestation from conduct of the principle for which he is
responsible.... Until there has been a communication to a particular person, and until that
person learns facts from which he reasonably infers that the agent is authorized, there is no
apparent authority .... ").
261. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 384 (persons entering into agreements with government assume
risk of having accurately ascertained scope of agent's authority, even where agent is unaware
of own authority); Mullan v. State, 114 Cal. 578, 46 P. 670 (1896) (State not estopped from
denying validity of contract made without authority because contractor in good faith per-
formed services under it, since contractor must at own peril know authority of those who seem
to act for State).
262. One author put the argument as follows:
The logic of the position is elementary. Apparent authority and estoppel must both
be predicated on a reliance by the party asserting the right. The authority of a public
agent or officer must be found in a public statute or a proper delegation pursuant
thereto. Since all persons are "presumed to know the law," or to have official notice
of its content, no one is justified in reliance on any appearance or representation of
authority to act for the Government contrary to that which is contained in the law
itself.
John A. McIntire, Authority of Government Contracting Officers Estoppel and Apparent Au-
thority, 25 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 162, 164 (1957).
263. Indeed, unless the requirements of a law are knowable, enforcement of the law may
violate due process. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948) ("Legislation may run afoul of the
Due Process Clause because it fails to give adequate guidance to those who would be law
abiding . . . ."); see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982)
("[B]ecause we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist
that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly ...."). Id. at 498 (quoting Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
264. United States v. Brown, 24 F. Cas. 1248, 1249 (D. Or. 1869) (No. 14,662).
265. Uniform Partnership Act § 12 (1914).
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as the authority of the individual government official increases, or as the
difficulty of ascertaining the law increases, the reasonableness of the pri-
vate individual's reliance increases, and the more loudly equity will call
out for the application of estoppel.2 66 Application of the concept of con-
structive notice to limit the reasonableness of reliance on governmental
representations only makes sense with reference to the type of representa-
tion and the source of the notice. A paradigm example of constructive
notification is the land title recordation system.267 The purpose of the
system is to convey information, and the information it conveys is ex-
plicit and accessible.268 In private estoppels, courts have held that re-
cording of the title to real property furnishes the party seeking estoppel
with constructive notice of the actual state of affairs, thus defeating the
estoppel.269 However, where the party to be estopped has made an af-
firmative representation contrary to the contents of the record, "it would
be in the highest degree inequitable to permit him to say that the other
party, who had relied upon his conduct and had been misled thereby,
might have ascertained the falsity of his representations.
270
Imputing to private citizens constructive notice of the content of the
Code of Federal Regulations, on the other hand, has been criticized as an
"absurdity. ' 271 If every person is deemed to "know the law," then no
bureaucratic error will ever give rise to reasonable reliance. The norma-
266. The dissent in Merrill urged that it was unreasonable to require a farmer to scour the
Federal Register in order to verify the statements of a government agent. Merrill, 332 U.S. at
387 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 990 n.6
(1973) ("We think it important to note that the more responsible the individual giving the
advice, the more reasonable the reliance and the greater the injustice in not permitting the
application of the estoppel defense.").
267. See, for example, Division 2, Part 4, Chapter 4 of the California Civil Code, "Record-
ing Transfers of Real Property," providing detailed rules governing the filing of record of title
with the county recorder, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1169-73 (West 1991), authentication and ac-
knowledgement of title instruments, id. §§ 1180-1201, and a legal presumption that persons
dealing with the property are aware of the contents of the officially recorded title documents,
id. §§ 1213-20.
268. See, eg., ia §§ 1180-1207 (requiring proof and acknowledgement of recorded instru-
ments); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 27230-65 (West 1991) (requiring recorder to maintain extensive
cross-indexing of recorded documents).
269. McClellan v. Penick, 298 F. 366 (5th Cir. 1923); 3 POMEROY, supra note 1, § 810a, at
221.
270. 3 POMEROY, supra note 1, § 810a, at 223 (citing Wiser v. Lawlor, 189 U.S. 260
(1903)).
271. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 387 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Expressions of judicial frustration
with the unintelligibility of administrative regulations are commonplace. See, e.g., Diamond
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 528 F.2d 645, 650 (5th Cir.
1976) (court refused to adopt agency interpretation of its own regulation since doing so would
"delay the day when the occupational safety and health regulations will be written in clear and
concise language so that employers will be better able to understand and observe them").
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tive "should have known" becomes a tautological bar to any estoppel: to
know the law is to know that there is no reasonable reliance sufficient to
give rise to estoppel.272 Once the Supreme Court has announced that
"[w]hatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone enter-
ing into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having
accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government
stays within the bounds of his authority," '273 any subsequent reliance on
an unauthorized act is per se unreasonable.274
Courts have recognized the practical limits of knowing the law.27
In Schuster v. Commissioner,276 the court estopped the federal govern-
ment from recovering a tax deficiency from a bank that had relied on a
ruling by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in not pay-
ing taxes on certain estate property which the bank administered as
trustee.277 The bank's reliance was detrimental in that it had distributed
the property to the heirs, and any deficiency would have to be paid by the
bank, even though the bank was not a beneficiary of the estate.278 The
reliance was reasonable in that the court could not see "what additional
action the bank might have taken to protect itself from liability."'27 9
Even though the action of the Commissioner was "of legislative signifi-
cance" and the policy against estoppel was therefore "particularly
strong, '280 this did not mean that the Commissioner could correct any
mistake of law regardless of the injustice that would result.
3. Balancing of public and private interests
Courts have also limited the application of estoppel to the state by
expressly balancing the injustice done to the private person with the pub-
272. The problem has been explained by Professor Tribe as follows: the norms which pro-
tect settled property rights from government appropriation
cannot be expressed entirely within the language of expectations; that path is a circu-
lar one inasmuch as expectations are themselves subject to governmental manipula-
tion.... Without appeal to such concerns [as the norms of regularity, autonomy and
equality], we are defenseless against the alluring but fatal argument that, since it is
government that gives, government is free to take as well.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-7, at 608-09 (2d ed. 1988).
273. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 384.
274. The Merrill Court noted that "[j]ust as everyone is charged with knowledge of the
United States Statutes at Large, Congress has provided that the appearance of rules and regu-
lations in the Federal Register gives legal notice of their contents." Id. at 384-85.
275. Id. at 387 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
276. 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1962).
277. Id. at 318.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 317.
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lic policy that would be supervened by an estoppel.281 Government in-
terests and policies which may be affected by raising an estoppel are the
separation of powers, drain on the public fisc, the risk of countenancing
fraud, and the effect on the dissemination of government information.282
A person's liberty or other personal interest is more likely to outweigh
the governmental interests, and hence, courts are more likely to grant an
estoppel than when mere economic interests are at stake.283 To gauge
the weight of the personal injustice in government estoppel cases, courts
employ criteria analogous to those which govern the imposition of
heightened levels of scrutiny in constitutional adjudication.284
Although some courts introduce both the balancing element and the
affirmative misconduct element as distinct requisites to government es-
toppel,285 the affirmative misconduct requirement is a special case of the
more general balancing rule. Affirmative misconduct is an element so
weighty that it tips the balance in favor of the private litigant.
The ability of government misconduct to overcome the policy rea-
sons against government estoppel has been recognized, at least in dicta,
by the United States Supreme Court. In Heckler v. Community Health
281. The rule as stated by the California Supreme Court in City of Long Beach v. Mansell
serves as an example:
The government may be bound by an equitable estoppel in the same manner as a
private party when the elements requisite to such an estoppel against a private party
are present and, in the considered view of a court of equity, the injustice which would
result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify any
effect upon public interest or policy which would result from the raising of an
estoppel.
3 Cal. 3d 462,496-97,476 P.2d 423, 448, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 48 (1970); see also Lazy FC Ranch,
481 F.2d at 989 ("[E]stoppel is available as a defense against the government if the govern-
ment's wrongful conduct threatens to work a serious injustice and if the public's interest would
not be unduly damaged by the imposition of estoppel.") (citation omitted).
282. See supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text.
283. See infra notes 297-333 and accompanying text.
284. See infra notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
285. See, eg., Watkins v. United States, 875 F.2d 699, 707 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990). Prior to examining elements of private estoppel, a government
estoppel claim must establish two threshold elements: (1) "'affirmative conduct going beyond
mere negligence,'" and (2) whether "'the government's wrongful act will cause a serious in-
justice, and the public's interest will not suffer undue damage.... "" Id. (quoting Morgan v.
Heckler, 779 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co., 716 F.
Supp. 429 (N.D. Cal. 1988):
The party seeking to raise estoppel against the government must establish [in addi-
tion to the traditional elements of estoppel] that (1) the government, via authorized
acts of its agents, engaged in affirmative misconduct going beyond mere negligence;
and (2) the injustice done to the party must outweigh the harm that will be done to
the public interest if the government is estopped.
Id. at 436.
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Services,286 the Court refused to estop the government from asserting
that Community Health Services was required to surrender program
funds erroneously paid to it under the Comprehensive Education and
Training Act (CETA).28 7 Community Health Services claimed that be-
cause it had relied on government advice to the effect that it was entitled
to the funds, the government was estopped from reversing its position.288
The Court denied the estoppel claim on private estoppel grounds, hold-
ing that because there was no entitlement to the funds under law, Com-
munity Health Services suffered no detriment by disgorging those
funds.289
In dicta, however, the Court refused to rule out the possibility of
applying estoppel against the government. Cases may arise, the Court
noted, "in which the public interest in ensuring that the Government can
enforce the law free from estoppel might be outweighed by the counter-
vailing interest of citizens in some minimum standard of decency, honor,
and reliability in their dealings with their Government."' 29 Notably, the
Court expressed the balancing as one between two public interests, the
interest in confidence in government and the interest in prohibiting gov-
ernment estoppel.291 Presumably, however, any determination of the ex-
tent of the public interest in confidence in government will necessarily
take into account the type and degree of detriment suffered by the private
litigant.
Lower courts had been using the balancing test for many years prior
to Heckler as grounds for granting government estoppels. For example,
in Oil Shale Corp. v. Morton,29 2 the court held that even if the adminis-
trative actions of the Secretary of the Interior were unauthorized or con-
trary to law, estoppel was still appropriate, since the erroneous advice
was "so closely connected to the basic fairness of the administrative deci-
sion-making process that the government may be estopped from dis-
avowing the misstatement.,
293
Unlike the affirmative misconduct rule, which liberalizes govern-
ment estoppel by providing a means for granting estoppel in a certain
class of cases, the balancing rule will not necessarily have a similar effect.
286. 467 U.S. 51 (1984).
287. Id at 61.
288. Id at 56-57.
289. Id. at 62-63.
290. Id at 60-61.
291. Id.
292. 370 F. Supp. 108 (D. Colo. 1973).
293. Id. at 126 (quoting Brandt v. Hieckel, 427 F.2d 53, 56 (9th Cir. 1970)). At issue were
oil leases erroneously granted under an earlier administrative decision. Id at 119.
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As long as respect for institutional boundaries is considered to be per se
more important than the liberty interests of individuals, the "balancing"
will always favor denying estoppel of the government.
Basing the application of government estoppel on a balancing of pri-
vate and public interests is, nevertheless, a salutary development. While
such a rule may be criticized as being vague and hence subject to
abuse,294 it does no violence to the basic nature of equitable remedies,
which are inherently flexible295 and dependent on the facts of each
case.
2 96
Recognition of this balancing also explains numerous decisions. In
criminal law, the liberty interests of individuals are scrupulously pro-
tected under constitutional and other safeguards.2 97 Rights of this con-
stitutional dimension weigh heavily against congressional policy and
public interest.298 Thus, the Supreme Court in United States v. Penn-
294. Whether the limitations of governmental authority may be based on principles other
than those expressed in positive law has long been debated. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
386 (1798) (Iridell, J.) (natural rights provide insufficiently firm basis for judicial review);
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); see
infra note 333.
295. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. at 2481 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Significant policy concerns
would of course be implicated by an indiscriminate use of estoppel against the Government.
But estoppel is an equitable doctrine. As such, it can be tailored to the circumstances of
particular cases, ensuring that fundamental injustices are avoided without seriously endanger-
ing the smooth operation of statutory schemes.").
296. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court's recent experience with setting up
an equitable balancing rule in the related context of governmental employee immunity from
state tort claims illustrates that there are limitations to the approach. In Westfall v. Erwin,
484 U.S. 292 (1988) (Marshall, 3.), the Court held that absolute official immunity should not
be granted unless "the contribution to effective Government in particular contexts outweighs
the potential harm to individual citizens." Id. at 300. Congress quickly overruled the decision
by passing the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 831c-2, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2679
(1988)), fearing that Westfall had "seriously eroded the common law tort immunity previously
available to Federal employees." Liability Reform Act § 2(a)(4), 102 Stat, at 4563.
297. Criminal convictions must be based on the "reasonable doubt" standard, a higher stan-
dard of proof than that which is usually required in civil jury findings. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
348 (1970) (proof beyond reasonable doubt constitutionally required in criminal cases). The
criminally accused has, for example, a right to a speedy trial, a right to freedom from self-
incrimination, and a right to assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (speedy trial,
assistance of counsel); U.S. CONsT. amend. V (self-incrimination).
298. Violation of these rights may result in dismissal of criminal charges without regard to
the guilt or innocence of the accused. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 484 (1973) (dis-
missal of charges only possible remedy for violation of Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial);
see also Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1982) (revocation of prisoner's
erroneously granted parole status, after prisoner successfully reintegrated himself into commu-
nity, would compromise prisoner's important expectation interest in freedom without serving
to alleviate threat to public safety).
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sylvania Industrial Chemical Corp. ,299 (PICCO) held that where the gov-
ernment had in effect "affirmatively misled" a corporation into believing
that its actions were not criminal, "traditional notions of fairness inher-
ent in our system of criminal justice prevent the Government from pro-
ceeding with the prosecution."'3"° Although PICCO was arguably not
decided on equitable estoppel grounds, °1 the opinion considered the pos-
sibility of affirmative misconduct by the government,30 2 reasonable detri-
mental reliance on the part of PICCO,3°3 and cited two law review
articles on estoppel.
304
Balancing of liberty and public interests also explains in part the
outcome of Clark v. United States.0 5 In Clark, the Supreme Court em-
phasized the unfairness of the government's challenging rightful owner-
ship of a steamship after inducing the owner to bring the ship within its
jurisdiction.306 The Court may have intended to bolster its decision by
reference to the need to protect Clark from entrapment.0 7
The relation between due process rights, entrapment, and estoppel is
made explicit in the so-called "entrapment by estoppel defense. ' 30 8 The
Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution 30 9 prohibit gov-
ernment officials from acting to induce the commission of criminal
acts.3  When a person reasonably relies on the legal advice of a public
official charged with interpreting the law, and as a result acts in violation
299. 411 U.S. 655 (1973).
300. Id. at 674.
301. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 68 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). But cf Office of Personnel Man-
agement v. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. 2465, 2477 (1990) (White, J., concurring) (PICCO "may well
have been decided on the basis of estoppel").
302. PICCO, 411 U.S. at 674.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 674-75 (citing Frank C. Newman, Should Official Advice Be Reliable?-Propos-
als as to Estoppel and Related Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 374
(1953); Note, Applying Estoppel Principles in Criminal Cases, 78 YALE L.J. 1046 (1969)).
305. 95 U.S. 539 (1877); see supra notes 153-71 and accompanying text.
306. Clark, 95 U.S. at 544.
307. Id. (government could not challenge claimant's title to steamship under statute gov-
erning dealing with the Confederacy, "after getting it within its jurisdiction under pretense of
hiring it of the claimant").
308. United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1404 (1lth Cir. 1990).
309. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... "); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ").
.310. United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1984). Although the due process
defense based on government misconduct "is often raised but is almost never successful," en-
trapment may be so outrageous as to violate due process. Id. at 856-57 (citing Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973)); United
States v. Gardner, 658 F. Supp. 1573 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (postal inspector's request that postal
worker purchase drugs violated due process). See generally Tim A. Thomas, Annotation,
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of a criminal statute, the person can defend on the grounds that the gov-
ernment is estopped to deny the correctness of the interpretation thus
given.311 It is the protection of the individual right to due process which
requires the raising of an estoppel against a government agent in such a
case.
The same analysis explains the Supreme Court's decision in Moser v.
United States,312 a case often cited as an example of the Supreme Court
granting a government estoppel.313 Moser was a Swiss national who
married an American woman and was living in the United States. The
State Department granted Moser an exemption from military service
pursuant to a treaty between the United States and Switzerland. 314 The
Department of State erroneously informed Moser that the exemption
would not act as a waiver of his right to United States citizenship. 315 In
fact, section 3(a) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940316
provided that an exemption from military duty of an alien would result
in permanent waiver of the ability to become a United States citizen.
317
The Court found that Moser had justifiably relied on the advice of "the
highest authority to which he could turn, 318 and that to bar Moser from
citizenship would violate principles of "elementary fairness. ' 319 The
Court asserted that it did not need to decide the case on an estoppel
theory, holding instead that only by means of a knowing and intelligent
waiver can a person effectively relinquish a right as important as the
right to citizenship.32°
The Court engaged in a balancing of private and public interests to
reach its result in Moser. The level of importance ascribed by the Court
to citizenship is indicated by its applying the same test-knowing and
What Conduct of Federal Law Enforcement Authorities in Inducing or Co-Operating in Crimi-
nal Offense Raises Due Process Defense Distinct From Entrapment, 99 A.L.R. FED. 273 (1990).
311. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (police official's advice to defendant as
to permissible location of demonstration barred later prosecution of defendant for demonstrat-
ing at that location).
312. 341 U.S. 41 (1951).
313. See Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. 2465, 2479 (1990) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1982); Frederick W.
Blumenschein, Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 47 BROOK. L. RaV. 423, 435
(1981).
314. Moser, 341 U.S. at 42.
315. Id. at 44.
316. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 3(a), 54 Stat. 885, 885-86 (re-
pealed 1945).
317. Moser, 341 U.S. at 42-43.
318. Id at 46.




intelligent waiver-applied to relinquishment of constitutional rights
such as the right to trial.32 ' The public interest behind the federal statute
regulating the admission of foreign nationals is also a strong interest.322
Nevertheless, the citizenship interest, as well as the reliance interest im-
plicated in the absence of knowing and intelligent waiver, were suffi-
ciently important to overcome both the public interest in regulating
immigration and the separation of powers interest implicit in overriding
a constitutional power of Congress.323
In Watkins v. United States,324 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, estopped the United States Army from refusing to grant
reenlistment to Sergeant Perry Watkins on the ground that he was an
avowed homosexual.325 Watkins' performance was exemplary, and the
court found no evidence that his homosexuality had a deleterious effect
on his unit.326 Therefore, the injustice to Watkins outweighed the nonex-
istent damage to the public interest in national security.327 Finding the
other elements of estoppel present, the court estopped the Army from
denying reenlistment on the basis of Watkins' homosexuality.328 The re-
sort to estoppel in Watkins resulted in the withdrawal of an earlier deci-
sion in the same case in which a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals had decided that homosexuals did not constitute a sus-
pect classification for purposes of equal protection scrutiny.329 The en
banc decision in Watkins illustrates that where the rights of the individ-
ual justify (or arguably justify) heightened equal protection scrutiny, the
balancing of those rights against the governmental interest can give rise
to an estoppel.
In PICCO, Moser and Watkins, the courts granted estoppel, or at
321. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (guilty plea must be based on intentional
and voluntary relinquishment of right to trial).
322. INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 19 (1982) (cases involving immigration laws and resi-
dency requirements implicate increasingly important interests and matters of broad public
concern). The area of immigration is one in which the separation of powers doctrine usually
requires courts to exercise great deference to the legislature. The Constitution authorizes Con-
gress to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. In view of this
plenary delegation of power, the Supreme Court has recognized that "'over no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of
aliens." Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
323. Moser, 341 U.S. at 47.
324. 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990).
325. Id. at 702.
326. Id. at 709.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 707-10.
329. Watkins v. United States, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988).
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least estoppel-like equitable relief, where the rights of the private party
were fundamental liberty interests.33 0 By contrast, most government es-
toppels involve economic rights, such as the right to receive benefits
under a government program or the right to recover under a contract
with the government. 331 Government limitations on economic rights are
subjected to extremely deferential "rational basis" scrutiny by the
Court.a32 The lack of any overt balancing of public and private interests
in such cases can be interpreted as a tacit recognition that the right in
question does not merit the intense scrutiny implied by a balancing of the
right against the government policy.33
3
330. See supra notes 297-329 and accompanying text.
331. See, eg., Richmond, 110 S. Ct. at 2465 (retirement annuity).
332. See, eg., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (Equal Protection Clause
not violated by city regulation banning certain hot dog vendors from New Orleans' French
Quarter on basis of number of years on job); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
(upholding statutory exemption of ready-to-wear eyeglass vendors from regulations applicable
to licensed opticians).
333. Ordinarily, the courts will not strike down a statute for violating the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if there is some rational basis for believing that the
statute will achieve some legitimate legislative end. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding legislation prohibiting display of mobile billboards but
permitting advertising of products sold by vehicle owner because distinction between them was
rationally related to conceivable legitimate legislative end). Legislative acts subjected to this
level of scrutiny are rarely struck down. Gerald Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972). The policy behind this judicial restraint is grounded in the separation of judicial and
legislative powers. See Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303 ("In short, the judiciary may not sit as a
superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made
in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines .... ."). When
legislation is based on "suspect classifications" such as race or sex, a highly intrusive judicial
review is warranted because of the presumption that such legislation violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. See, eg., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down Oklahoma statute
that permitted sale of 3.2% beer to females older than 18, but prohibited its sale to males
under 21); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia anti-miscegenation
statute on basis of "most rigid scrutiny"). A separate strand of equal protection cases gave
heightened scrutiny to legislation impinging on a "fundamental right." See, e.g., Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667, 670 (1966) (striking down Virginia poll tax of
$1.50, finding right to vote "fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights,"
and "mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted... classifications which
might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.").
The Supreme Court has since restricted the tendency to invoke the Equal Protection
Clause to protect "fundamental rights" not explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. See San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (refusing to recognize right to
education as fundamental right). The Rodriguez Court stated:
[T]he key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in
comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsis-
tence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as impor-
tant as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a
right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
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4. Vested rights
A possible alternative approach to the equitable protection of pri-
vate persons from governmental overreaching lies in the doctrine of
"vested rights." When a private person's right has "vested," the right
acquires the status of "property" which cannot be taken by the state
without just compensation.334 The government, of course, may exercise
its eminent domain power and condemn the property or otherwise appro-
priate the entitlement,33 5 but if it does so it must, under the Fifth
Id. at 33.
The Court struggled to provide a criterion by which the fundamentalness of a right could
be measured. See, eg., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 62-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("As the nexus
between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer,
the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny
applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accord-
ingly.") The derivation of fundamental interests from the Equal Protection Clause itself, how-
ever, inevitably encountered the same interpretive problems that led to the demise of
substantive due process: the risk that judicial review ultimately would be based not on consti-
tutional mandate but rather on judges' own interpretation of natural law was too great to
sustain development of the doctrine. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 91 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting) ("[To pass upon the constitutionality of statutes by looking to the par-
ticular standards enumerated in the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution is one
thing; to invalidate statutes because of application of 'natural law' deemed to be above and
undefined by the Constitution is another."); see also GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 787-88 (11th ed. 1985) (discussing limitations of fundamental rights approach).
Courts which grant estoppel where the private litigant's reliance interest overbalances the
separation of powers are in effect applying a fundamental rights analysis. Just as in equal
protection analysis, intrusive judicial review cannot be justified in government estoppel cases
unless the private right is sufficiently "fundamental" to outweigh the limitations on the court's
power imposed by the separation of powers. The search for fundamental rights is no less
problematic in the area of government estoppel than in the area of equal protection. Likewise,
the need for justifying judicial intrusion is no less urgent. If the Equal Protection Clause can
not be invoked to justify judicial review of fundamental rights, it is difficult to see how funda-
mental rights can be used to justify government estoppel.
334. See, eg., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 196-98 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (retirees had obtained vested right in retirement benefits which was
immune from subsequent congressional revocation); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 624
(1960) (Black, J., dissenting) (Congress was not free to revoke benefits that were not "gratui-
ties," and to do so was to "break its plighted faith"); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577
(1934) (federal government's issuance of insurance policies created "vested rights," not "gratu-
ities [to] be redistributed or withdrawn at any time in the discretion of Congress"); Avco
Community Developers v. South Coast Reg. Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 791, 553 P.2d 546, 550,
132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 390 (1976) ("Once a landowner has secured a vested right the government
may not, by virtue of a change in the zoning laws, prohibit construction authorized by the
permit upon which he relied.").
335. See, eg., West River Bridge v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 535 (1848) (" 'All separate
interests of individuals in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or
implied reservation [of eminent domain] .... [T]he people in their sovereign capacity ... have
a right to resume the possession of the property ... whenever the public interest requires it.' ")
(quoting Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 72-73 (N.Y. Ch. 1831)).
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Amendment, pay just compensation to the owner.33 6 The term "vested
rights" is a conclusory term, which merely "forecloses the searching
analysis necessary to a proper dissection of the problem. ' 337 Indeed, any
right which has not vested is still susceptible of revocation or abridgment
and is more properly understood as a mere privilege or revocable license.
Thus, the term "vested rights" is probably redundant, in that if an enti-
tlement is not "vested," it is not a "right" at all.338
A vested rights claim "is a species of governmental estoppel, ' ' 339 in
which actions on the part of a private person render a formal governmen-
tal action or promise immune from repudiation. 34° The Supreme Court
has intimated the relationship between estoppel and takings: "While the
consent of individual officials representing the United States cannot
'estop' the United States, it can lead to the fruition of a number of expec-
tancies embodied in the concept of 'property'-expectancies that, if suffi-
ciently important, the Government must condemn and pay for ....,341
Just as the weight appropriate to liberty interests can be analogized
to due process and equal protection standards, the balancing of public
and private economic property rights may draw its substance from the
takings jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment. Although economic
rights are at stake in regulatory takings, and although such rights are left
virtually without protection by the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause, the Fifth Amendment may require heightened
scrutiny.
342
336. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
337. Richard B. Cunningham & David H. Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land
Development Process, 29 HASTINGs L.J. 625, 626 (1978).
338. A property right creates an entitlement such that "someone who wishes to remove the
entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value
of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller." Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L.
REv. 1089, 1092 (1972).
339. Lakeview Dev. Corp. v. City of S. Lake Tahoe, 915 F.2d 1290, 1295 (9th Cir. 1990)
(citing Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 68 Cal. App. 3d 965, 985, 137
Cal. Rptr. 699, 712 (1977)).
340. Id.
341. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979).
342. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). In Nollan, the Court
applied heightened scrutiny to strike down an administrative agency's decision to condition a
building permit on the landowner granting a public easement. Id. at 837. The Court noted
that "[there] is no reason to believe (and the language of our cases gives some reason to disbe-
lieve) that so long as the regulation of property is at issue the standards for takings challenges,
due process challenges, and equal protection challenges are identical." Id. at 834 n.3. The
heightened scrutiny which the Court applied in Nollan is "[n]ot quite the stuff to rehabilitate
property rights after Carolene Product's footnote 4, but close." Richard A. Epstein, Takings:




The United States Supreme Court in Richmond v. Office of Person-
nel Management 343 sent a clear message that the proper grounds for es-
topping the government are much narrower than many lower courts had
heretofore realized. At the same time, however, the Court suggested that
a litigant who has been dealt an injustice by the federal government
should look to the executive and legislative branches, rather than to the
courts, for relief. The Court's suggestion that litigants seek relief by
means of a private bill has a cynical ring given the limitations of that
remedy. Nevertheless, pursuit of other political remedies is not only fea-
sible; given the Court's hostility towards estoppel claims it may be
necessary.
Congress is not the only level at which non-judicial remedies can be
sought. The administrative agencies charged with carrying out congres-
sional intent may have sufficient authority to undo individual wrongs,
and to promulgate rules designed to prevent maladministration of gov-
ernment. For example, the error which misled the plaintiff in Richmond
could have been avoided by requiring periodic audits of informational
materials being disseminated by the Navy's employment specialists.
Such an authority will remain unlikely to provide these palliatives, how-
ever, unless the political branches can be made responsive to the hard-
ships they are capable of inflicting.
Just as under Richmond government estoppel can be limited by the
Constitution, so too, perhaps, can the Constitution provide justification
for government estoppel. The cases which employ a balancing of rights
approach to determine whether the hardship suffered by the private citi-
zen justifies the imposition of government estoppel indicate the feasibility
of such an approach. Rights sufficiently fundamental to justify judicial
repeal of repugnant legislation may also justify the judicial enforcement
of administrative actions which are beyond the literal scope of statutory
authorization. Absent some such check on the power of the government
to do wrong, there will be no defense to the maxim "the government
giveth, and the government taketh away."
V. CONCLUSION
The development of government estoppel in the United States dem-
onstrates that the early cases treated estoppel of the state no differently
than estoppel of private persons. Barriers to government estoppel are
erected out of respect for the separation of powers between the judiciary
343. 110 S. Ct. 2465 (1990).
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and the other branches of government. The effect of estopping the state
is to nullify the operation of a law as to the person who relied on the
state's misrepresentation. Ordinarily, such a nullification is within the
power of the judiciary only when based on constitutional grounds. The
limits on the power of government to harm its citizens are found in the
Constitution and in government's self-reflexive surrender of that power
by express statutory means. The equity power of the judiciary, typified
by the remedy of estoppel, is ill-suited to the task of overcoming the
structural limitation on the court's ability to undo legislative and admin-
istrative actions. Where courts have resorted to estoppel or estoppel-like
remedial mechanisms, they have employed a balancing of public and pri-
vate interests analogous to that employed in the granting of constitution-
ally-based relief under the Due Process, Equal Protection, or Takings
Clauses. When constitutionally justifiable intrusion is not warranted,
political branches ought to provide the remedy in the form of administra-
tive rule-making and legislation.
Frederick S. Kuhlman*
* Thanks are due to Professors Mark D. Rosenbaum and Arnold I. Siegel who read and
commented on prior drafts. Special thanks to Erin for her constant support.
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